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Institutional	  Flip-­‐Flops	  	  Eric	  A.	  Posner*	  and	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein**	  	  
Abstract	  
	  
Many	  people	  vigorously	  defend	  particular	  institutional	  judgments	  on	  such	  
issues	  as	  the	  filibuster,	  recess	  appointments,	  executive	  privilege,	  federalism,	  and	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  These	  judgments	  are	  defended	  publicly	  with	  great	  
intensity	  and	  conviction,	  but	  some	  of	  them	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  exceedingly	  fragile,	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  their	  advocates	  are	  prepared	  to	  change	  their	  positions	  as	  soon	  as	  
their	  ideological	  commitments	  cut	  in	  the	  other	  direction.	  For	  example,	  
institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  can	  be	  found	  when	  Democratic	  officials,	  fiercely	  
protective	  of	  the	  filibuster	  when	  the	  President	  is	  a	  Republican,	  end	  up	  rejecting	  
the	  filibuster	  when	  the	  President	  is	  a	  Democrat.	  Other	  flip-­‐flops	  seem	  to	  occur	  
when	  Supreme	  Court	  justices,	  generally	  insistent	  on	  the	  need	  for	  deference	  to	  
the	  political	  process,	  show	  no	  such	  deference	  in	  particular	  contexts.	  	  
	  
Our	  primary	  explanation	  is	  that	  many	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  a	  product	  of	  
“merits	  bias,”	  a	  form	  of	  motivated	  reasoning	  through	  which	  short-­‐term	  political	  
commitments	  make	  complex	  and	  controversial	  institutional	  judgments	  seem	  
self-­‐evident	  (thus	  rendering	  those	  judgments	  vulnerable	  when	  short-­‐term	  
political	  commitments	  cut	  the	  other	  way).	  We	  offer	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  
claim	  that	  merits	  bias	  plays	  a	  significant	  role.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  institutional	  judgments	  are	  essentially	  opportunistic	  
and	  rhetorical,	  and	  others	  are	  a	  product	  of	  the	  need	  for	  compromise	  within	  
multimember	  groups	  (including	  courts).	  Judges	  might	  join	  opinions	  with	  which	  
they	  do	  not	  entirely	  agree,	  and	  the	  consequence	  can	  be	  a	  degree	  of	  institutional	  
flip-­‐flopping.	  Importantly,	  some	  apparent	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  a	  result	  of	  learning,	  as,	  
for	  example,	  when	  a	  period	  of	  experience	  with	  a	  powerful	  president,	  or	  a	  
powerful	  Supreme	  Court,	  leads	  people	  to	  favor	  constraints.	  In	  principle,	  
institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  should	  be	  reduced	  or	  prevented	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  
some	  kind	  of	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  But	  in	  the	  relevant	  contexts,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  veil	  
runs	  into	  severe	  normative,	  conceptual,	  and	  empirical	  problems,	  in	  part	  
because	  the	  veil	  might	  deprive	  agents	  of	  indispensable	  information	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	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likely	  effects	  of	  institutional	  arrangements.	  We	  explore	  how	  these	  problems	  
might	  be	  overcome.	  
	  
Introduction	  	  What	  is	  the	  legitimate	  authority	  of	  the	  President,	  Congress,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court?	  What	  is	  the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  the	  national	  government	  and	  the	  states?	  Many	  people	  have	  firm	  views	  about	  such	  questions.	  The	  puzzle	  is	  that	  in	  numerous	  cases,	  those	  responses	  seem	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  single	  (and	  apparently	  irrelevant)	  question:	  Who	  currently	  controls	  the	  relevant	  institutions?	  Because	  the	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  changes	  over	  time,	  history	  is	  full	  of	  what	  we	  shall	  call	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops:	  judgments	  that	  shift	  dramatically	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  affiliations	  and	  substantive	  views	  of	  those	  who	  occupy	  the	  offices	  in	  question.	  	  	  Consider	  a	  few	  recent	  examples.	  Under	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  Democratic	  senators	  aggressively	  defended	  the	  use	  of	  the	  filibuster,	  while	  Republican	  senators	  vigorously	  opposed	  it.1	  Under	  President	  Barack	  Obama,	  the	  two	  sides	  essentially	  flipped.	  Republican	  senators	  vigorously	  defended	  the	  use	  of	  the	  filibuster,	  which	  was	  sharply	  opposed	  by	  Democrats.2	  	  	  Or	  consider	  this	  question:	  Does	  the	  president	  have	  broad	  power	  to	  make	  recess	  appointments?	  Frustrated	  by	  Democratic	  opposition	  to	  many	  of	  his	  nominees,	  President	  Bush	  certainly	  thought	  so.3	  Many	  Republican	  senators	  agreed,	  while	  prominent	  Democratic	  senators	  did	  not.4	  Under	  President	  Obama,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	  e.g.,	  Carl	  Hulse,	  Filibuster	  Fight	  Nears	  Showdown,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  May	  8,	  2005,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/politics/08judges.html	  (quoting	  Senator	  Charles	  Schumer	  defending	  the	  filibuster	  as	  part	  of	  “the	  age-­‐old	  checks	  and	  balances	  that	  the	  founding	  fathers	  placed	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Republic,”	  and	  reporting	  on	  Republican	  criticism	  of	  filibustering	  Democrats	  as	  “uncompromising	  obstacles	  to	  popular	  legislation”).	  2	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jeremy	  W.	  Peters,	  Democrats	  Poised	  to	  Limit	  Filibusters,	  Angering	  G.O.P.,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  July	  11,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/us/politics/showdown-­‐nears-­‐in-­‐senate-­‐over-­‐filibusters-­‐change.html	  (reporting	  Democratic	  insistence	  on	  limiting	  the	  filibuster	  to	  remedy	  “dysfunction,”	  while	  Republicans	  claimed	  that	  such	  limits	  would	  “do	  irreversible	  damage	  to	  [the	  Senate	  as]	  an	  institution”).	  3	  See,	  e.g.,	  Neil	  A.	  Lewis,	  Bypassing	  Senate	  for	  the	  Second	  Time,	  Bush	  Seats	  Judge,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Feb.	  21,	  2004,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/21/politics/21JUDG.html	  (reporting	  on	  President	  Bush’s	  appointment	  of	  Judge	  William	  H.	  Pryor	  Jr.	  during	  a	  weeklong	  Congressional	  recess);	  Jim	  Rutenberg,	  
Bush	  Uses	  Recess	  to	  Fill	  Envoy	  Post	  and	  2	  Others,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  5,	  2007,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/washington/05bush.html?fta=y&_r=0.	  4	  See	  Lewis,	  supra	  note	  3	  (reporting	  that	  “Republican	  Senate	  officials	  suggested	  .	  .	  .	  that	  there	  may	  be	  more	  such	  recess	  appointments	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Democrats’	  tactic	  of	  using	  filibusters	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  extended	  debates	  to	  block	  confirmation	  of	  the	  president’s	  judicial	  nominees”	  while	  quoting	  Senator	  Charles	  Schumer	  as	  calling	  the	  recess	  appointment	  a	  “questionably	  legal	  and	  politically	  shabby	  technique”);	  Rutenberg,	  supra	  note	  3	  (quoting	  then	  Senator	  John	  Kerry’s	  statement	  that	  President	  Bush	  “abuse[d]	  the	  power	  of	  the	  presidency”	  by	  appointing	  the	  ambassador	  to	  Belgium	  over	  the	  Senate’s	  objections).	  
3	  	  
Republicans	  were	  outraged,	  and	  Democrats	  were	  supportive	  or	  quiet.5	  Similarly,	  President	  Bush	  issued	  a	  large	  number	  of	  signing	  statements,	  in	  which	  he	  asserted	  the	  constitutional	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  president	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  questioning	  legislation	  that,	  in	  his	  view,	  intruded	  on	  those	  prerogatives.6	  Democrats	  vehemently	  objected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  signing	  statements,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seemed	  to	  signal	  a	  deep	  and	  enduring	  institutional	  opposition	  to	  them.7	  By	  contrast,	  President	  Obama’s	  signing	  statements	  have	  not	  produced	  much	  protest	  from	  Democrats8	  (even	  though	  several	  involved	  contested	  issues	  with	  respect	  to	  presidential	  authority	  to	  protect	  national	  security).9	  	  There	  is	  a	  closely	  related	  type	  of	  flip-­‐flop	  where	  a	  person’s	  position	  on	  an	  institutional	  question	  does	  not	  depend	  so	  much	  on	  who	  currently	  controls	  the	  
relevant	  institutions	  but	  on	  what	  particular	  political	  outcome	  will	  result.	  Consider	  a	  lawsuit	  brought	  by	  the	  attorneys	  general	  of	  Nebraska	  and	  Oklahoma,	  seeking	  to	  block	  Colorado’s	  legalization	  of	  marijuana	  possession	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  federal	  law	  criminalizes	  possession.	  These	  same	  attorneys	  general	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  is	  unconstitutional	  because	  it	  violates	  states’	  rights.	  Critics	  argue	  that	  the	  attorneys	  general	  have	  flip-­‐flopped.	  “It	  is	  as	  if	  their	  arguments	  about	  federalism	  and	  state	  autonomy	  were	  not	  arguments	  of	  principle	  but	  rather	  an	  opportunistic	  effort	  to	  challenge	  federal	  policies	  they	  don’t	  like	  on	  other	  grounds.”10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Sheryl	  Gay	  Stolberg,	  Obama	  Bypasses	  Senate	  Process,	  Filling	  15	  Posts,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Mar.	  28,	  2010,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/28recess.html	  (reporting	  a	  “flurry	  of	  angry	  statements”	  from	  Republican	  Senators);	  David	  Nakamura	  &	  Felicia	  Sonmez,	  Obama	  Defies	  Senate,	  
Puts	  Cordray	  in	  Consumer	  Post,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Jan.	  5,	  2012,	  at	  A1	  (reporting	  that	  Senate	  Democrats	  “defended	  the	  administration’s	  move”).	  6	  See,	  e.g.,	  Statement	  on	  Signing	  the	  Duncan	  Hunter	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  2009,	  Oct.	  14,	  2008,	  44	  Weekly	  Compilation	  of	  Presidential	  Docs.	  1346	  (“Provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  .	  .	  .	  purport	  to	  impose	  requirements	  that	  could	  inhibit	  the	  President’s	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  constitutional	  obligations	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  Charlie	  Savage,	  Bush	  Declares	  Exceptions	  to	  Sections	  of	  Two	  Bills	  He	  
Signed	  into	  Law,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Oct.	  15,	  2008,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/washington/15signing.html.	  7	  Carl	  Hulse,	  Lawmakers	  to	  Investigate	  Bush	  on	  Laws	  and	  Intent,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  June	  20,	  2007,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/washington/20cong.html	  (Senator	  Robert	  Byrd	  objected	  to	  President	  Bush’s	  use	  of	  signing	  statements:	  “Federal	  law	  is	  not	  some	  buffet	  line	  where	  the	  president	  can	  pick	  parts	  of	  some	  laws	  to	  follow	  and	  others	  to	  reject”).	  8	  Karen	  Tumulty,	  Obama	  Criticized	  Over	  ‘Signing	  Statements’,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  3,	  2014,	  at	  A8	  (quoting	  a	  member	  of	  an	  American	  Bar	  Association	  panel	  criticizing	  the	  use	  of	  signing	  statements:	  “When	  Bush	  was	  issuing	  signing	  statements,	  the	  Republicans	  didn’t	  care.	  When	  Obama	  was	  doing	  it,	  Democrats	  didn’t	  care.”).	  9	  For	  institutional	  judgments,	  there	  is	  a	  pervasive	  possibility	  of	  path	  dependence,	  as	  when	  people	  become	  committed	  to	  some	  such	  judgments	  at	  Time	  1,	  and	  are	  therefore	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  extricate	  themselves	  at	  Time	  2,	  thus	  reducing	  flip-­‐flops.	  A	  prominent	  example	  might	  be	  New	  Deal	  liberals	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  who	  adopted	  a	  firm	  position	  against	  an	  aggressive	  judicial	  role,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  approve	  of	  the	  role	  carved	  out	  by	  the	  Warren	  Court.	  Justice	  Felix	  Frankfurter	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  famous	  case	  in	  point.	  Many	  theories	  of	  judicial	  review	  are	  an	  effort	  to	  response	  to	  a	  charge	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping.	  In	  the	  context	  at	  hand,	  see	  JOHN	  HART	  ELY,	  DEMOCRACY	  AND	  DISTRUST	  (1983);	  RONALD	  DWORKIN,	  TAKING	  RIGHTS	  SERIOUSLY	  (1977).	  10	  Jonathan	  H.	  Adler,	  Are	  Nebraska	  and	  Oklahoma	  Just	  Fair-­‐Weather	  Federalists?,	  VOLOKH	  CONSPIRACY	  (Dec.	  19,	  2014),	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-­‐conspiracy/wp/2014/12/19/are-­‐nebraska-­‐and-­‐oklahoma-­‐just-­‐fair-­‐weather-­‐federalists/	  (last	  visited	  Jan.	  19,	  2015).	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On	  this	  view,	  they	  are	  “fair-­‐weather	  federalists”11	  who	  promote	  or	  deride	  federalism	  based	  on	  their	  views	  of	  the	  substantive	  political	  outcomes	  at	  stake.	  	  From	  these	  and	  other	  examples	  of	  real	  or	  apparent	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  (for	  example)	  that	  when	  some	  people	  make	  broad	  and	  seemingly	  universal	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  respecting	  executive	  power,	  what	  they	  mean	  is	  that	  they	  like	  and	  trust	  the	  current	  president.	  And	  when	  some	  legislators	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  allowing	  Congress	  to	  check	  the	  power	  of	  the	  president	  as	  such,	  they	  mean	  that	  they	  dislike	  and	  distrust	  the	  current	  president.	  Their	  purportedly	  neutral	  institutional	  judgments	  are	  motivated	  and	  determined	  by	  the	  occupant	  of	  the	  office	  at	  the	  time	  that	  they	  are	  making	  those	  judgments.	  	  	  We	  might	  also	  conclude	  that	  when	  people	  make	  an	  argument	  based	  on	  federalism	  or	  executive	  primacy	  in	  some	  domain,	  they	  really	  mean	  that	  they	  care	  about	  a	  specific	  policy	  outcome	  that	  happens	  to	  be	  advanced,	  in	  that	  particular	  instance,	  by	  the	  states	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  national	  government)	  or	  the	  president	  (as	  opposed	  to	  Congress).	  	  To	  say	  the	  least,	  it	  is	  disturbing	  if	  firm	  and	  apparently	  timeless	  statements	  about	  institutional	  authority	  are	  in	  fact	  an	  artifact	  of	  short-­‐term	  judgments	  about	  substance,	  and	  not	  institutions	  at	  all.12	  	   	  Institutional	  flip-­‐flops,	  real	  or	  apparent,	  also	  play	  a	  role	  within	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  Within	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  a	  flip-­‐flop	  might	  result	  from	  an	  overriding	  interest	  in	  who	  controls	  relevant	  institutions,	  or	  more	  broadly	  on	  whose	  ox	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  gored	  –	  about	  the	  short-­‐term	  substantive	  effect,	  in	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  of	  one	  or	  another	  approach	  to	  a	  disputed	  issue.	  Should	  the	  Court	  defer	  to	  legislative	  fact-­‐finding	  or	  to	  agency	  interpretations	  of	  law?	  Should	  it	  follow	  the	  Constitution’s	  original	  meaning?	  Should	  it	  give	  the	  political	  process	  the	  benefit	  of	  every	  doubt?	  Should	  it	  give	  respect	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  states?	  On	  all	  of	  these	  questions,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  find	  real	  or	  apparent	  flip-­‐flops.13	  	  To	  take	  a	  prominent	  and	  much-­‐discussed	  example,	  many	  people	  who	  abhor	  Lochner	  v.	  New	  York,14	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  form	  of	  illegitimate	  judicial	  activism,	  are	  quite	  comfortable	  with	  Roe	  v.	  Wade.15	  In	  the	  same	  week	  in	  which	  Justice	  Antonin	  Scalia	  joined	  an	  opinion	  striking	  down	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Voting	  Rights	  Act,16	  he	  issued	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  dissenting	  opinion	  from	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  strike	  down	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Id.	  12	  We	  discuss	  below	  the	  complication	  introduced	  by	  the	  view	  that	  institutional	  judgments	  must,	  in	  the	  end,	  be	  defended	  by	  their	  substantive	  effects.	  13	  See,	  e.g.,	  Thomas	  J.	  Miles	  &	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Do	  Judges	  Make	  Regulatory	  Policy?:	  An	  Empirical	  
Investigation	  of	  Chevron,	  73	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  823,	  825–26	  (2006)	  (the	  most	  conservative	  members	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  validate	  liberal	  agency	  statutory	  interpretations	  and	  the	  least	  conservative	  members	  of	  the	  Court	  show	  the	  opposite	  pattern).	  14	  198	  U.S.	  45	  (1905).	  15	  410	  U.S.	  113	  (1973).	  16	  See	  Shelby	  Cnty.	  v.	  Holder,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2613	  (2013)	  (decided	  June	  25,	  2013).	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Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act,	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  judicial	  restraint.17	  Within	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  legal	  profession	  generally,	  are	  institutional	  judgments	  a	  product	  of	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  likely	  composition	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  majorities?	  If	  so,	  is	  that	  a	  problem?	  Is	  it	  a	  problem	  if	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  who	  are	  committed,	  in	  principle,	  to	  following	  the	  original	  understanding	  fail	  to	  do	  so	  in	  cases	  that	  involve	  standing,	  affirmative	  action,	  or	  commercial	  advertising	  (a	  species	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping)?	  	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  debates	  over	  national	  power	  are	  replete	  with	  at	  least	  apparent	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops.	  Those	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  should	  have	  broad	  power	  to	  preempt	  state	  efforts	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  immigration	  may	  be	  reluctant	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  should	  have	  broad	  power	  to	  preempt	  state	  tort	  law.18	  Perhaps	  apparent	  inconsistencies	  of	  this	  kind	  can	  be	  justified,	  once	  we	  specify	  the	  appropriate	  principles,	  but	  in	  the	  area	  of	  preemption,	  as	  in	  other	  areas	  that	  involve	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  the	  states,	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  some	  people’s	  institutional	  judgments	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question:	  On	  the	  matter	  at	  hand,	  should	  we	  prefer	  the	  
substantive	  judgments	  of	  the	  national	  government	  or	  instead	  the	  states?	  If	  that	  is	  indeed	  the	  driving	  force,	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  inevitable,	  at	  least	  over	  a	  sufficiently	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  	  	   In	  principle,	  of	  course,	  the	  answers	  to	  institutional	  questions	  should	  not	  depend	  on	  short-­‐term	  considerations,	  such	  as	  the	  political	  affiliations	  and	  beliefs	  of	  those	  who	  currently	  occupy	  particular	  offices.19	  The	  long-­‐term	  effect	  on	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  what	  matters.	  Some	  kind	  of	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  might	  be	  invoked	  to	  provide	  enduring	  answers.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  veil	  is	  that	  if	  people	  imagine	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  their	  party	  affiliation,	  or	  even	  many	  of	  their	  interests,	  they	  can	  more	  easily	  agree	  on	  the	  institutional	  norms	  that	  would	  advance	  the	  public	  interest.	  In	  many	  contexts,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  pervasive	  problem:	  If	  we	  put	  ourselves	  behind	  such	  a	  veil,	  we	  might	  find	  it	  exceptionally	  difficult	  to	  identify	  clear	  answers	  to	  institutional	  questions.	  In	  the	  abstract,	  what	  is	  the	  right	  approach	  to	  the	  filibuster,	  recess	  appointments,	  signing	  statements,	  preemption,	  or	  the	  exercise	  of	  moral	  judgments	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court?	  It	  is	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  answering	  such	  questions	  that	  people’s	  judgments	  tend	  to	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	  short-­‐term	  considerations	  of	  substance.	  More	  interestingly,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  runs	  into	  plausible	  objections,	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  deprive	  people	  of	  indispensable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Windsor,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2675,	  2697	  (2013)	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (decided	  June	  26,	  2013).	  18	  See	  infra	  note	  48	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  19	  We	  can	  imagine	  qualifications.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  with	  a	  certain	  otherwise	  appealing	  approach	  to	  institutional	  questions,	  the	  result	  would	  be	  certain	  catastrophe	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  If	  so,	  it	  might	  seem	  best	  to	  avoid	  the	  catastrophe.	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  a	  question	  whether	  judges	  or	  others	  could	  take	  account	  of	  potential	  consequences	  of	  that	  kind.	  See	  generally	  JOSEPH	  RAZ,	  PRACTICAL	  REASON	  AND	  NORMS	  (3d	  ed.,	  1999)	  (exploring	  “exclusionary	  reasons”	  as	  negative	  second-­‐order	  reasons—reasons	  to	  refrain	  from	  acting	  for	  some	  reasons).	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information.	  Nor	  is	  it	  exactly	  easy	  to	  encourage	  participants	  in	  institutional	  debates	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  long-­‐term,	  because	  of	  the	  strong	  incentives	  they	  face	  to	  do	  otherwise.	  	   Some	  people	  might	  even	  wonder	  whether	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  a	  significant	  problem.	  It	  seems	  like	  a	  species	  of	  hypocrisy,	  and	  hypocrisy	  in	  politics	  is	  as	  old	  as	  politics	  itself.20	  In	  our	  view,	  however,	  flip-­‐flipping	  causes	  serious	  harm,	  both	  because	  it	  leads	  to	  unproductive	  debates	  and	  because	  it	  produces	  bad	  outcomes	  (sometimes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  inaction).	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  continuous	  flip-­‐flopping	  reveals	  disagreements	  about	  institutional	  norms	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  resolved	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  good	  governance.	  As	  we	  shall	  also	  see,	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  often	  a	  form	  of	  bad	  reasoning	  that	  should	  be	  strongly	  discouraged.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping	  can	  compromise	  rule	  of	  law	  values.	  Because	  accusations	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  are	  as	  promiscuous	  as	  flip-­‐flopping	  itself,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  flip-­‐flops	  from	  learning	  and	  other	  innocent	  forms	  of	  behavior.	  	  	   Our	  principal	  goal	  in	  this	  Article	  is	  to	  elaborate	  the	  concept	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  and	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  are	  so	  pervasive.	  In	  Part	  I,	  we	  provide	  examples	  and	  derive	  some	  typologies	  from	  them.	  In	  Part	  II,	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Article,	  we	  offer	  explanations.	  First,	  some	  flip-­‐flops	  seem	  to	  be	  naïve,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  people’s	  views	  about	  institutional	  values	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  political	  outcomes	  they	  desire	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  they	  may	  well	  be	  unaware	  of	  that	  fact.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  people’s	  short-­‐term	  substantive	  commitments	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  psychological	  priority,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	  supportive	  institutional	  judgment	  (“of	  course	  the	  President	  cannot	  have	  
that	  authority”)	  seems	  self-­‐evident,	  even	  if	  the	  opposing	  institutional	  judgment	  would	  seem	  self-­‐evident	  (“of	  course	  the	  President	  has	  that	  authority”)	  if	  the	  substantive	  commitments	  were	  otherwise.	  In	  such	  cases,	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  result	  from	  what	  we	  shall	  call	  merits	  bias,	  which	  amounts	  to	  a	  form	  of	  motivated	  reasoning.	  We	  offer	  some	  empirical	  support	  for	  our	  claim	  that	  merits	  bias	  is	  both	  real	  and	  important.	  	   When	  merits	  bias	  is	  at	  work,	  people’s	  institutional	  judgments	  are	  motivated	  by	  their	  substantive	  commitments.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  many	  flip-­‐flops	  among	  political	  insiders	  and	  judges	  are	  tactical.	  In	  such	  cases,	  institutional	  arguments	  are	  made	  opportunistically,	  and	  hence	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  they	  flip.	  	  	   We	  also	  show	  that	  positions	  that	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  flip-­‐flops	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  nothing	  of	  the	  sort.	  What	  is	  true	  for	  objections	  to	  apparent	  hypocrisy	  is	  also	  true	  for	  objections	  to	  apparent	  flip-­‐flopping:	  An	  investigation	  of	  people’s	  actual	  beliefs	  might	  reveal	  that	  such	  objections	  have	  no	  merit.	  If	  a	  judge	  has	  a	  particular	  theory	  of	  constitutional	  interpretation,	  her	  apparently	  aggressive	  approach	  to	  one	  statute	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Of course, there is a great deal of work exploring the phenomenon of hypocrisy in politics. See, e.g., 
DAVID RUNCIMAN, POLITICAL HYPOCRISY: THE MASK OF POWER, FROM HOBBES TO ORWELL AND BEYOND 
(2008); MARTIN JAY, THE VIRTUES OF MENDACITY: ON LYING IN POLITICS (2012); Hannah Arendt, ON 
REVOLUTION (2006 ed.); Judith Shklar, ORDINARY VICES (1985). This literature explores when hypocrisy 
and related vices like lying are and are not justified in politics, with the useful thought that sometimes these 
vices may serve larger political purposes. 
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might	  not	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  her	  apparently	  passive	  approach	  to	  another.	  The	  governing	  principle	  might	  be	  complex	  and	  fine-­‐grained,	  and	  once	  it	  is	  identified,	  an	  apparent	  flip-­‐flop	  might	  disintegrate.	  In	  addition,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  interestingly,	  changes	  in	  institutional	  judgments	  might	  reflect	  one	  or	  another	  form	  of	  learning.	  The	  most	  complex	  setting	  involves	  people’s	  adjustments	  of	  their	  institutional	  commitments	  as	  a	  result	  of	  learning	  that	  those	  commitments	  lead	  to	  unfortunate	  	  substantive	  outcomes	  (and	  not	  merely	  in	  the	  short-­‐term),	  thus	  justifying	  those	  adjustments.	  	  	   In	  Part	  III,	  we	  explore	  a	  way	  forward.	  We	  argue	  that	  flip-­‐flops	  arise	  in	  the	  first	  place	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  people—as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  psychology	  and	  politics—to	  differentiate	  optimal	  institutional	  design	  (“the	  rules	  of	  the	  game”)	  and	  the	  specific,	  short-­‐term	  political	  outcomes	  they	  care	  about,	  especially	  when	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  political	  debate.	  Yet	  the	  “gotcha”	  response	  is	  unhelpful;	  changing	  one’s	  institutional	  views	  may	  well	  be	  justified.	  In	  general,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  alleged	  flip-­‐flops	  is	  to	  enlist	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance—a	  device	  that	  forces	  people	  to	  evaluate	  institutional	  arrangements	  abstracted	  away	  from	  their	  short-­‐term	  substantive	  commitments.	  But	  in	  the	  relevant	  contexts,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  veil	  runs	  into	  genuine	  normative,	  conceptual,	  and	  empirical	  problems,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  veil	  might	  deprive	  agents	  of	  indispensable	  information	  about	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  institutional	  arrangements.	  We	  explore	  what	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  in	  this	  context,	  and	  how	  those	  problems	  might	  be	  resolved.	  	  
I.	  Examples	  and	  Typologies	  	  A. Flip-­‐Flops:	  Real	  or	  Merely	  Apparent?	  	   1.	  Relevant	  distinctions.	  An	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  a	  reversal	  of	  one’s	  position	  on	  an	  institutional	  value	  based	  on	  partisan	  or	  political	  interests	  or	  substantive	  commitments.	  Here	  is	  a	  way	  of	  specifying	  the	  idea:	  People	  flip-­‐flip	  when	  (1)	  at	  two	  distinct	  points	  in	  time	  they	  take	  different	  positions	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  claim	  of	  institutional	  authority	  for	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  decisions,	  and	  (2)	  there	  are	  no	  relevant	  differences	  that	  would	  justify	  the	  shift.21	  	  We	  distinguish	  two	  types	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops.	  A	  partisan	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop	  occurs	  when	  the	  reversal	  results	  from	  the	  change	  in	  party	  control	  of	  the	  relevant	  institution.	  A	  Democrat	  who	  decries	  presidential	  power	  when	  the	  president	  is	  a	  Republican	  and	  defends	  it	  when	  the	  president	  is	  Democratic	  engages	  in	  a	  partisan	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop.	  A	  substantive	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop	  occurs	  when	  the	  reversal	  results	  from	  differences	  or	  changes	  in	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  relevant	  institutions.	  A	  conservative	  who	  invokes	  federalism	  to	  defend	  states	  that	  restrict	  abortion	  but	  then	  invokes	  the	  supremacy	  of	  national	  power	  when	  Congress	  limits	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  engages	  in	  a	  substantive	  flip-­‐flop	  (unless	  some	  principle	  is	  available	  to	  justify	  the	  different	  invocations).	  While	  we	  note	  this	  distinction,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Aziz	  Huq	  for	  help	  with	  this	  formulation.	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think	  that	  these	  types	  of	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  phenomenon,	  and	  will	  use	  examples	  of	  both	  throughout	  our	  discussion.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  begin	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  genuine	  flip-­‐flops,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  neutral	  justification	  for	  the	  flip,	  and	  less	  clear	  cases,	  in	  which	  a	  neutral	  justification	  can	  be	  identified,	  raising	  a	  question	  whether	  a	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  involved	  at	  all.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  Democratic	  senator	  vigorously	  defends	  filibustering	  federal	  judges	  who	  are	  nominated	  by	  a	  Republican	  president,	  but	  later	  contends	  that	  it	  is	  unacceptable	  to	  filibuster	  federal	  judges	  who	  are	  nominated	  by	  a	  Democratic	  president.	  If	  so,	  a	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  involved.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  institutional	  commitment	  appears	  weakly	  held	  or	  even	  non-­‐existent:	  the	  senator’s	  position	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  filibuster	  is	  wholly	  derivative	  of	  his	  views	  about	  the	  President;	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  identify	  a	  relevant	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  situations	  that	  would	  justify	  the	  shift.	  	  	  The	  matter	  is	  far	  more	  complicated	  if	  a	  judge	  votes	  in	  favor	  of	  upholding	  (say)	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  but	  not	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act.	  A	  critic	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  judge	  has	  flip-­‐flopped,	  perhaps	  by	  taking	  different	  positions	  on	  judicial	  authority,	  or	  on	  federalism	  and	  national	  power.	  But	  in	  cases	  of	  this	  kind,	  we	  may	  have	  an	  apparent	  rather	  than	  real	  case	  of	  flip-­‐flopping.	  Different	  constitutional	  problems	  and	  provisions	  are	  involved,	  and	  no	  simple	  position	  on	  judicial	  authority	  is	  likely	  to	  cut	  across	  problems	  and	  provisions.	  In	  the	  example	  at	  hand,	  for	  example,	  a	  judge	  might	  endorse	  some	  form	  of	  democracy-­‐reinforcing	  judicial	  review,22	  calling	  for	  a	  deferential	  approach	  to	  congressional	  action	  under	  the	  Commerce	  Clause	  (and	  hence	  to	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act),	  but	  a	  more	  aggressive	  approach	  to	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  (and	  hence	  to	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act).	  So	  too,	  judges	  who	  vote	  to	  invalidate	  a	  physical	  invasion	  of	  private	  property	  under	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  need	  not	  be	  engaged	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  flip-­‐flop	  if	  they	  vote	  to	  uphold	  restrictions	  on	  commercial	  advertising.	  Perhaps	  those	  judges	  are	  originalists,23	  and	  perhaps	  their	  view	  of	  the	  original	  understanding	  calls	  for	  invalidation	  of	  physical	  invasions	  but	  validation	  of	  restrictions	  on	  advertisements.	  If	  so,	  we	  have	  no	  flip-­‐flop	  at	  all.	  	   	  2.	  A	  possible	  objection.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  the	  role	  of	  neutral	  justification	  below,	  but	  at	  the	  outset,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explore	  a	  possible	  objection.	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  insist	  that	  on	  institutional	  questions,	  any	  particular	  position	  has	  to	  be	  defended	  on	  some	  substantive	  ground.	  We	  might	  favor	  an	  institutional	  judgment	  –	  say,	  a	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  of	  one	  or	  another	  kind	  -­‐-­‐	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  will	  increase	  social	  welfare,	  or	  promote	  democratic	  self-­‐government,	  or	  increase	  national	  security,	  or	  safeguard	  liberty.	  The	  senate	  filibuster,	  or	  presidential	  power	  to	  act	  unilaterally	  to	  protect	  the	  nation	  against	  immediate	  threats,	  might	  be	  justified	  on	  one	  or	  another	  such	  ground.	  Institutions	  are	  normally	  seen	  as	  arrangements	  that	  produce	  bundles	  of	  expected	  policy	  outcomes	  -­‐-­‐	  not	  as	  entities	  that	  are	  intrinsically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  JOHN	  HART	  ELY,	  DEMOCRACY	  AND	  DISTRUST	  (1983).	  23	  Antonin	  Scalia,	  Originalism:	  The	  Lesser	  Evil,	  57	  U.	  CIN.	  L.	  REV.	  849	  (1989).	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appealing	  or	  valuable	  in	  themselves.24	  It	  is	  hardly	  embarrassing	  to	  support	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  good	  outcomes,	  all	  things	  considered.	  In	  this	  light,	  we	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  raise	  a	  question	  about	  the	  whole	  category	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops.	  When	  people	  take	  one	  position	  on	  the	  filibuster	  under	  a	  Republican	  president,	  and	  other	  position	  under	  a	  Democratic	  president,	  is	  this	  apparent	  inconsistency	  due	  to	  divergent	  judgments	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  filibusters?	  Is	  that	  a	  flip-­‐flop	  at	  all?	  In	  what	  sense?	  	  Suppose	  that	  someone’s	  considered	  position	  is	  this:	  “I	  favor	  the	  filibuster	  under	  Republican	  presidents,	  but	  not	  under	  Democratic	  presidents.”	  Or	  this:	  “I	  approve	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  aggressive	  signing	  statements	  by	  Republican	  presidents,	  but	  not	  by	  Democratic	  presidents.”	  On	  this	  approach,	  the	  expected	  (short-­‐term)	  political	  commitments	  of	  the	  relevant	  institutions	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  governing	  institutional	  position.	  And	  indeed,	  we	  shall	  give	  evidence	  that	  many	  people	  seem	  to	  think	  in	  these	  terms.	  But	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  themselves	  in	  this	  way,	  which	  suggests	  that	  views	  of	  this	  sort	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  defend	  publicly.	  In	  fact	  they	  would	  seem	  both	  self-­‐serving	  and	  preposterous,	  because	  they	  would	  settle	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  by	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  political	  views	  of	  the	  relevant	  players.	  In	  public	  debate,	  people	  usually	  make	  institutional	  arguments	  that	  purport	  to	  appeal	  across	  partisan	  divides	  and	  across	  disagreements	  about	  policy	  outcomes;	  that	  is	  why	  no	  one	  would	  publicly	  argue	  that	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  is	  justified	  because	  it	  favors	  one	  party	  or	  leads	  to	  a	  specific	  political	  outcome	  that	  is	  controversial.	  	  On	  social	  welfare	  grounds,	  reasonable	  people	  might	  refuse	  to	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  and	  reject	  agreed-­‐upon	  institutional	  norms,	  if	  and	  because	  they	  lead	  to	  extremely	  bad	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  we	  could	  imagine	  a	  view	  that	  would	  support	  a	  shift	  in	  institutional	  arrangements	  if	  political	  power	  were	  suddenly	  obtained	  by	  fascists	  or	  communists.	  (Note,	  however,	  that	  if	  fascists	  or	  communists	  really	  obtained	  power,	  an	  institutional	  shift	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  who	  resisted	  them	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  take	  hold.)	  Some	  people	  think	  that	  democrats	  in	  Egypt,	  after	  supporting	  the	  move	  to	  elections,	  repudiated	  democracy	  when	  they	  saw	  that	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  Islamist	  rule.25	  Moreover,	  any	  position	  on	  (say)	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  president	  and	  the	  federal	  judiciary	  has	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  trust	  in	  those	  who	  occupy	  the	  relevant	  offices.	  As	  new	  information	  arrives	  –	  including	  new	  information	  about	  likely	  performance	  or	  preferences	  –	  judgments	  about	  appropriate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Adrian	  Vermeule	  for	  this	  formulation	  and	  for	  pressing	  this	  point.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  impossible	  that	  some	  people	  believe	  that	  (for	  example)	  democracy	  and	  other	  fundamental	  institutional	  arrangements	  are	  intrinsically,	  rather	  than,	  or	  as	  well	  as,	  instrumentally	  valuable,	  our	  argument	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  whether	  institutional	  preferences	  are	  instrumental	  or	  non-­‐instrumental.	  25	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jackson	  Diehl,	  Egypt’s	  ‘Democrats’	  Abandon	  Democracy,	  Wash.	  Post,	  July	  21,	  2013,	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-­‐diehl-­‐egypts-­‐democrats-­‐abandon-­‐democracy/2013/07/21/58beace0-­‐efc8-­‐11e2-­‐9008-­‐61e94a7ea20d_story.html	  (“What	  happened	  to	  Egypt’s	  young	  liberals?	  	  Five	  years	  ago,	  they	  were	  the	  most	  promising	  [democratic]	  movement	  in	  [the]	  Arab	  world	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Now	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  are	  cheering	  [the	  military	  coup].”).	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institutional	  authority	  might	  change,	  not	  least	  because	  predictions	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  one	  or	  another	  allocation	  might	  change.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  shifts	  of	  that	  kind	  reflect	  learning.	  They	  might	  well	  be	  flip-­‐flops,	  but	  there	  is	  nothing	  dishonorable	  about	  them	  –	  a	  point	  to	  which	  we	  shall	  return.	  	  	   B. Political	  Debate	  	   Within	  Congress,	  unambiguous	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  easy	  to	  find.	  We	  have	  already	  catalogued	  a	  number	  of	  them.	  Many	  public	  officials	  have	  switched	  position	  on	  both	  filibustering	  and	  signing	  statements,	  taking	  the	  pro-­‐executive	  side	  when	  their	  party	  holds	  the	  presidency,	  and	  rejecting	  that	  side	  when	  the	  presidency	  is	  held	  by	  the	  opposing	  party.	  An	  especially	  vivid	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  2013	  and	  2014,	  when	  the	  Senate’s	  Democratic	  majority	  enacted	  filibuster	  reform	  that	  it	  vigorously	  resisted	  under	  President	  Bush,26	  and	  that	  met	  exceptionally	  fierce	  resistance	  from	  Senate	  Republicans27	  –	  who	  themselves	  flipped	  to	  support	  the	  reform	  when	  they	  attained	  a	  majority.28	  Here	  is	  a	  confident	  prediction:	  If	  a	  Republican	  president	  is	  elected	  in	  2016,	  we	  will	  see	  further	  flips	  on	  these	  issues.	  	   For	  another	  example,	  consider	  the	  parties’	  positions	  on	  war	  powers.	  In	  1999,	  many	  Republicans	  in	  Congress	  objected	  when	  President	  Clinton	  sent	  military	  forces	  into	  Serbia	  without	  congressional	  consent.29	  They	  argued	  that	  under	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  the	  president	  may	  go	  to	  war	  only	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  Congress;	  and	  under	  the	  War	  Powers	  Act,	  the	  president	  must	  withdraw	  forces	  from	  hostilities	  if	  he	  has	  not	  received	  congressional	  authorization.30	  Many	  Republicans	  also	  complained	  when	  President	  Obama	  used	  military	  force	  without	  congressional	  authorization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  Jeremy	  W.	  Peters,	  In	  Landmark	  Vote,	  Senate	  Limits	  Use	  of	  Filibuster,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Nov.	  21,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-­‐sets-­‐in-­‐motion-­‐steps-­‐to-­‐limit-­‐use-­‐of-­‐filibuster.html?ref=politics;	  Jeremy	  W.	  Peters,	  New	  Senate	  Rules	  to	  Curtail	  the	  Excesses	  of	  a	  Filibuster,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  24,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/bipartisan-­‐filibuster-­‐deal-­‐is-­‐reached-­‐in-­‐the-­‐senate.html.	  27	  See	  159	  CONG.	  REC.	  S8415-­‐16	  (daily	  ed.	  Nov.	  21,	  2013)	  (statement	  of	  Sen.	  McConnell)	  (“If	  you	  want	  to	  play	  games,	  set	  yet	  another	  precedent	  that	  you	  will	  no	  doubt	  come	  to	  regret	  .	  .	  .	  you	  will	  regret	  this,	  and	  you	  may	  regret	  it	  a	  lot	  sooner	  than	  you	  think.”).	  28	  See	  Carl	  Hulse,	  Mitch	  McConnell’s	  New	  Senate	  Goal:	  Turn	  Republican	  Dial	  to	  Yes,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Dec.	  22,	  2014,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/us/politics/mitch-­‐mcconnells-­‐new-­‐senate-­‐goal-­‐turn-­‐republican-­‐dial-­‐to-­‐yes.html	  (“McConnell	  does	  not	  seem	  inclined	  to	  push	  ahead	  [on	  reversing	  the	  Democrats’	  rule	  change	  lowering	  the	  threshold	  for	  breaking	  a	  filibuster	  to	  a	  simple	  majority],	  despite	  earlier	  indications	  from	  him	  that	  Republicans	  should	  do	  so.”).	  29	  See	  John	  M.	  Broder,	  Clinton	  Says	  Force	  is	  Needed	  to	  Halt	  Kosovo	  Bloodshed,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Mar.	  20,	  1999,	  http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/20/world/conflict-­‐balkans-­‐overview-­‐clinton-­‐says-­‐force-­‐needed-­‐halt-­‐kosovo-­‐bloodshed.html;	  Helen	  Dewar,	  Kosovo	  Policy	  Further	  Strains	  Relations	  Between	  
Clinton,	  Hill,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Mar.	  27,	  1999,	  at	  A5	  (“The	  Senate	  Republicans	  accused	  President	  Clinton	  of	  having	  .	  .	  .	  ‘abrogated	  his	  constitutional	  duty.’”).	  30	  See	  Bill	  Miller,	  Clinton’s	  War	  Powers	  Upheld,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  9,	  1999,	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐srv/national/daily/june99/dismiss09.htm	  (describing	  lawsuit	  filed	  by	  twenty	  six	  members	  of	  Congress	  against	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  demanding	  congressional	  approval	  to	  continue	  U.S.	  military	  involvement	  in	  Kosovo).	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against	  Libya	  and	  threatened	  to	  do	  so	  against	  Syria.31	  Yet	  Republicans	  did	  not	  object	  when	  President	  Reagan	  used	  military	  force	  without	  congressional	  authorization	  in	  Granada,	  and	  when	  President	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  used	  military	  force	  without	  congressional	  authorization	  in	  Panama.	  Meanwhile,	  many	  Democrats	  objected	  to	  these	  uses	  of	  unilateral	  presidential	  power	  by	  Republican	  presidents,32	  and	  did	  not	  complain	  when	  President	  Obama	  used	  military	  force	  without	  congressional	  consent	  in	  Libya,33	  nor	  when	  President	  Clinton	  did	  so	  in	  Serbia.34	  	   The	  parties	  also	  appear	  to	  flip-­‐flop	  over	  the	  relevance	  of	  statutory	  constraints	  on	  other	  presidential	  powers.	  During	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration,	  prominent	  congressional	  Democrats	  complained	  that	  Bush	  disregarded	  statutes	  that	  restricted	  interrogation	  practices,	  surveillance,	  and	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  detainees	  alleged	  to	  be	  terrorists.35	  During	  the	  Obama	  administration,	  prominent	  congressional	  Republicans	  have	  complained	  that	  Obama	  has	  disregarded	  immigration,	  education,	  and	  health	  statutes.	  In	  a	  short	  time,	  we	  have	  thus	  witnessed	  a	  dramatic	  partisan	  flip-­‐flop	  over	  whether	  the	  presidency	  has	  become	  too	  powerful—whether	  an	  “imperial	  presidency”	  exists	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  reined	  in.36	  Of	  course	  some	  people	  have	  a	  general	  objection	  to	  what	  they	  see	  as	  excessive	  presidential	  authority,	  cutting	  across	  partisan	  divides.37	  What	  we	  are	  emphasizing	  here	  is	  that	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  pervasive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  Charlie	  Savage,	  Attack	  Renews	  Debate	  Over	  Congressional	  Consent,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Mar.	  21,	  2011,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22powers.html.	  32	  See	  Dan	  Balz	  &	  Thomas	  B.	  Edsall,	  GOP	  Rallies	  Around	  Reagan;	  Democrats	  Divided	  on	  Grenada,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Oct.	  26,	  1983,	  at	  A8	  (although	  “[m]ost	  Republicans	  .	  .	  .	  said	  Reagan’s	  actions	  were	  justified,”	  some	  Democrats	  “questioned	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  invasion”);	  Thomas	  L.	  Friedman,	  Fighting	  in	  Panama:	  
Reaction;	  Congress	  Generally	  Supports	  Attack,	  but	  Many	  Fear	  Consequences,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Dec.	  21,	  1989,	  http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/21/world/fighting-­‐panama-­‐reaction-­‐congress-­‐generally-­‐supports-­‐attack-­‐but-­‐many-­‐fear.html	  (quoting	  Democrat	  Charles	  Rangel	  criticizing	  President	  Bush’s	  military	  action	  in	  Panama:	  “As	  much	  as	  I	  would	  like	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  bum	  in	  Panama,	  I	  don’t	  see	  the	  legal	  authority	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  military.”).	  33	  Jeff	  Zeleny,	  Airstrikes	  in	  Libya;	  Questions	  Back	  Home,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Mar.	  21,	  2011,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/africa/21prexy.html	  (“The	  action	  against	  Colonel	  Qaddafi’s	  forces	  drew	  support	  from	  many	  Democrats	  .	  .	  .	  .”).	  34	  See	  Dewar,	  supra	  note	  28	  (“As	  many	  Democrats	  see	  it,	  the	  Republican	  attacks	  on	  Clinton’s	  Kosovo	  policy	  arise	  more	  from	  a	  sense	  that	  Clinton	  has	  largely	  escaped	  injury	  on	  domestic	  issues,	  leaving	  foreign	  policy	  as	  a	  weakness	  worth	  exploring.”).	  35	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Scott	  Shane,	  Democrat	  Says	  Spy	  Briefings	  Violated	  Law,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  5,	  2006,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/05/politics/05nsa.html;	  Jonathan	  Weisman,	  Bush’s	  Challenges	  of	  
Laws	  He	  Signed	  is	  Criticized,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  28,	  2006,	  at	  A9.	  36	  See,	  e.g.,	  Katie	  Zezima	  &	  Robert	  Costa,	  GOP	  Vows	  to	  Counter	  Obama,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Nov.	  22,	  2014,	  at	  A1	  (describing	  lawsuit	  filed	  by	  House	  Republicans	  accusing	  President	  Obama	  of	  violating	  immigration	  statutes	  and	  the	  Affordable	  Case	  Act);	  Obama	  Education	  Policies	  Add	  Fuel	  to	  Lawsuit	  Bid,	  EDUC.	  WEEK,	  Aug.	  20,	  2014,	  http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01lawsuit.h34.html.	  	  37	  For	  an	  early	  version,	  see	  ARTHUR	  SCHLESINGER,	  THE	  IMPERIAL	  PRESIDENCY	  (1973);	  see	  also	  DANA	  D.	  NELSON,	  BAD	  FOR	  DEMOCRACY:	  HOW	  THE	  PRESIDENCY	  UNDERMINES	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  THE	  PEOPLE	  (2008);	  CHARLIE	  SAVAGE,	  TAKEOVER:	  THE	  RETURN	  OF	  THE	  IMPERIAL	  PRESIDENCY	  AND	  THE	  SUBVERSION	  OF	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  (2008);	  ANDREW	  RUDALEVIGE,	  THE	  NEW	  IMPERIAL	  PRESIDENCY:	  RENEWING	  PRESIDENTIAL	  POWER	  AFTER	  WATERGATE	  (2006).	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It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  of	  these	  cases	  may	  involve	  apparent	  rather	  than	  real	  flip-­‐flops.	  Democrats	  objected	  that	  Bush	  exceeded	  his	  constitutional	  war	  powers.38	  Republicans	  tended	  to	  argue	  that	  Obama	  violated	  relevant	  statutes	  by	  underenforcing	  them	  in	  a	  manner	  inconsistent	  with	  prosecutorial	  discretion	  that	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  president.39	  With	  their	  various	  views	  on	  these	  particular	  issues,	  both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  need	  not	  have	  flip-­‐flopped.	  Without	  flip-­‐flopping,	  one	  might	  believe	  that	  the	  President	  has	  broad	  authority	  over	  the	  use	  of	  force	  without	  having	  broad	  authority	  not	  to	  enforce	  domestic	  legislation.	  It	  is	  thus	  possible,	  depending	  on	  one’s	  views	  about	  the	  president’s	  constitutional	  authority,	  to	  believe	  that	  neither	  party	  flip-­‐flopped	  (or	  that	  both	  did).	  But	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  politicians	  have	  not	  tried	  very	  hard	  to	  show	  that	  their	  positions	  have	  been	  consistent,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  inconsistency	  has	  been	  palpable.	  	  C.	  Constitutional	  Law	  	  	   Within	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  it	  is	  also	  easy	  to	  find	  at	  least	  apparent	  flip-­‐flops,	  especially	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  judges	  should	  defer	  to	  the	  political	  process.	  In	  United	  States	  v.	  Windsor,	  for	  example,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  struck	  down	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  (DOMA),	  which	  denied	  federal	  tax	  and	  related	  benefits	  to	  same-­‐sex	  married	  couples.40	  Justice	  Kennedy,	  writing	  for	  the	  Court,	  ruled	  that	  DOMA	  violated	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  because	  Congress	  had	  singled	  out	  persons	  in	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  for	  disparagement.41	  In	  his	  dissent,	  Justice	  Scalia	  complained	  that	  the	  Court’s	  holding	  would	  distort	  “democracy”	  by	  interfering	  with	  the	  public	  debate	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  “We	  might	  have	  let	  the	  People	  decide,”	  he	  lamented.42	  And	  yet	  in	  two	  other	  cases	  decided	  the	  same	  week,	  Justice	  Scalia	  joined	  opinions	  that	  did	  not	  let	  the	  People	  decide	  but	  struck	  down	  duly	  enacted	  statutes	  or	  programs—section	  4	  of	  the	  Voting	  Rights	  Act	  in	  Shelby	  County	  v.	  Holder,	  and	  the	  affirmative	  action	  program	  at	  issue	  in	  Fisher	  v.	  University	  of	  Texas	  Austin.43	  In	  its	  various	  forms,	  the	  phrase	  “We	  might	  have	  let	  the	  People	  decide”	  seems	  to	  be	  used	  opportunistically.	  	  	   Justice	  Kennedy	  launched	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  merits	  in	  Windsor	  with	  a	  paean	  to	  the	  federalist	  system	  and	  the	  central	  role	  of	  states	  in	  defining	  marriage,44	  and	  yet	  in	  Fisher,	  he	  wrote	  a	  majority	  opinion	  that	  did	  not	  explore	  the	  possibility	  that	  Texas	  may	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  experimenting	  with	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  or	  that	  states	  play	  a	  traditional	  role	  in	  determining	  educational	  policy.45	  Justice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See,	  e.g.,	  Sheryl	  Gay	  Stolberg	  &	  Jeff	  Zeleny,	  Democrats	  Stand	  Firm	  After	  Bush’s	  Iraq	  Veto;	  No	  Sign	  
Either	  Side	  Will	  Back	  Down,	  INT’L	  HERALD	  TRIB.,	  May	  3,	  2007,	  at	  1.	  39	  See	  supra	  note	  29.	  40United	  States	  v.	  Windsor,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2675,	  2695–96	  (2013).	  41	  Id.	  42	  Id.	  at	  2711	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  43	  Shelby	  Cnty.	  v.	  Holder,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2612,	  2631	  (2013);	  Fisher	  v.	  Univ.	  of	  Tex.	  at	  Austin,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2411,	  2415	  (2013).	  44	  Windsor,	  133	  S.Ct.	  at	  	  2691–92.	  45	  See	  Fisher,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2411	  (2013).	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Ginsburg	  wrote	  an	  eloquent	  dissent	  in	  Shelby	  Country	  noting	  the	  importance	  of	  giving	  “deference”	  to	  congressional	  fact-­‐finding	  while	  joining	  Kennedy’s	  majority	  opinion	  in	  Windsor,	  which	  gave	  Congress’	  views	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  no	  deference	  at	  all.46	  	  	  	   We	  surveyed	  colleagues	  for	  their	  favorite	  (or	  least	  favorite)	  example	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  We	  offer	  them	  here	  not	  necessarily	  as	  real	  rather	  than	  apparent	  illustrations	  –	  no	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  necessarily	  involved	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  as	  reflecting	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  terrain	  offered	  by	  specialists.	  Among	  the	  notable	  answers:	  	  	   Bush	  v.	  Gore	  and	  federalism.	  Chief	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  and	  Justices	  O’Connor,	  two	  of	  the	  Court’s	  most	  vigorous	  advocates	  of	  federalism,47	  joined	  a	  majority	  opinion	  that	  disregarded	  Florida	  election	  law	  and	  handed	  the	  2000	  presidential	  election	  to	  George	  W.	  Bush.	  Dissenters,	  including	  Justices	  Ginsburg	  and	  Breyer,	  emphasized	  the	  value	  of	  federalism,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  	  their	  other	  opinions.48	  	  	   Federalism	  and	  preemption.	  Similarly,	  conservative	  justices	  who	  advocate	  federalism—in	  addition	  to	  Chief	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  and	  Justices	  O’Connor,	  Kennedy,	  Scalia,	  and	  Thomas—are	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  find	  preemption	  of	  state	  law	  when	  business	  interests	  are	  at	  stake,	  causing	  liberal	  justices	  who	  vote	  the	  other	  way	  to	  accuse	  them	  of	  flip-­‐flopping,	  and	  exactly	  the	  same	  charge	  could	  be	  made	  against	  those	  same	  liberal	  justices,	  who	  are	  normally	  less	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  states.49	  	  	   Lawrence	  v.	  Texas	  and	  stare	  decisis.	  Justice	  Kennedy	  wrote	  a	  plurality	  opinion	  in	  Planned	  Parenthood	  v.	  Casey	  that	  provided	  an	  elaborate	  justification	  for	  stare	  decisis	  in	  explaining	  why	  he	  would	  not	  overturn	  Roe	  v.	  Wade.50	  But	  then	  in	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  he	  disregarded	  the	  recent	  precedent	  of	  Bowers	  v.	  Hardwick	  in	  the	  course	  of	  striking	  down	  a	  law	  that	  criminalized	  sodomy	  between	  people	  of	  the	  same	  sex.51	  	  	   Printz	  and	  Textualism.	  Justice	  Scalia	  is	  famous	  for	  his	  advocacy	  of	  textualism,	  the	  doctrine	  that	  judicially	  enforced	  norms	  must	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  text	  of	  statutes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Shelby	  Cnty.,	  133	  S.Ct.	  at	  2636	  (2013)	  (Ginsburg,	  J.,	  dissenting);	  see	  Windsor,	  133	  S.Ct.	  2675	  (2013).	  47	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  Gregory	  v.	  Ashcroft,	  501	  U.S.	  452,	  459	  (1991)	  (“In	  the	  tension	  between	  federal	  and	  state	  power	  lies	  the	  promise	  of	  liberty”);	  New	  York	  v.	  United	  States,	  505	  U.S.	  144,	  187	  (1992)	  (the	  Constitution	  “divides	  power	  among	  sovereigns	  ...	  precisely	  so	  that	  we	  may	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  concentrate	  power	  in	  one	  location	  as	  an	  expedient	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  day”);	  and	  Nat'l	  League	  of	  Cities	  v.	  Usery,	  426	  U.S.	  833	  (1976).	  See	  also	  Printz	  v.	  United	  States,	  521	  U.S.	  898	  (1997).	  For	  a	  useful	  discussion,	  see	  Edward	  L.	  Rubin	  &	  Malcolm	  Feeley,	  Federalism:	  Some	  
Notes	  on	  a	  National	  Neurosis,	  41	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  903	  (1993-­‐1994).	  48	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  531	  U.S.	  98,	  135	  (2000)	  (Ginsburg,	  J.,	  dissenting);	  Id.	  at	  144	  (Breyer,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  49Andrew	  M.	  Siegel,	  The	  Court	  Against	  the	  Courts:	  Hostility	  to	  Litigation	  as	  an	  Organizing	  Theme	  in	  the	  
Rehnquist	  Court’s	  Jurisprudence,	  84	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1097,	  1167	  (2006).	  50	  Planned	  Parenthood	  v.	  Casey,	  505	  U.S.	  833,	  853–69	  (1992).	  51	  See	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  539	  U.S.	  558	  (2003).	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or	  the	  Constitution.52	  Yet	  in	  Printz	  v.	  United	  States,	  he	  found	  that	  a	  statute	  that	  required	  state	  officials	  to	  enforce	  federal	  gun	  control	  regulations	  unconstitutional	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  textual	  ban	  on	  “commandeering.”53	  Empirical	  research	  suggests	  that	  justices	  sometimes	  invoke	  interpretative	  canons	  opportunistically	  while	  achieving	  ideologically	  preferred	  results.54	  	  	   The	  First	  Amendment	  and	  Originalism.	  Justice	  Scalia	  is	  the	  Court’s	  most	  vigorous	  proponent	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  originalism,	  and	  Justice	  Thomas	  has	  proclaimed	  himself	  an	  adherent	  of	  that	  doctrine	  on	  numerous	  occasions.	  They	  have	  written	  numerous	  opinions	  based	  on	  originalist	  arguments.	  Yet	  few	  scholars	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  given	  persuasive	  originalist	  justifications	  for	  their	  claims	  that	  the	  First	  Amendment	  blocks	  campaign	  finance	  regulations55	  or	  that	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  blocks	  affirmative	  action	  programs56	  or	  that	  Article	  III	  forbids	  Congress	  from	  conferring	  standing	  on	  citizens.57	  Frequently,	  they	  say	  nothing	  at	  all	  about	  the	  original	  understanding	  of	  the	  relevant	  constitutional	  provisions.	  	  	   Boumediene	  and	  congressional	  authorization	  of	  emergency	  measures.	  In	  his	  one-­‐page	  concurrence	  in	  Hamdan	  v.	  Rumsfeld,	  Justice	  Breyer	  explained	  that	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  that	  the	  executive	  lacked	  the	  authority	  to	  try	  Al	  Qaeda	  suspects	  in	  military	  commissions	  was	  based	  on	  a	  simple	  principle:	  “Congress	  has	  not	  issued	  the	  Executive	  a	  ‘blank	  check.’”58	  But	  when	  Congress	  took	  out	  its	  checkbook	  and	  authorized	  military	  commissions	  in	  the	  Military	  Commission	  Act,	  Justice	  Breyer	  joined	  an	  opinion	  that	  struck	  down	  a	  provision	  in	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  violated	  the	  Suspension	  Clause	  of	  the	  Constitution.59	  	  	   Delegation	  and	  Chevron.	  In	  Clinton	  v.	  City	  of	  New	  York,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  struck	  down	  the	  line-­‐item	  veto	  statute	  as	  an	  impermissible	  delegation	  of	  legislative	  power	  to	  the	  president.60	  Yet	  the	  author	  of	  the	  majority	  opinion—Justice	  Stevens—also	  wrote	  the	  majority	  opinion	  in	  Chevron,	  which	  provided	  the	  legal	  foundations	  of	  the	  administrative	  state	  by	  holding	  that	  courts	  must	  defer	  to	  executive-­‐branch	  statutory	  interpretations	  based	  on	  congressional	  delegations	  of	  legislative	  powers	  to	  regulatory	  agencies	  controlled	  by	  the	  president.61	  	  	   Rules,	  Standards,	  and	  Sebelius.	  In	  Massey	  v.	  Caperton,	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  wrote	  a	  dissent	  criticizing	  the	  majority’s	  holding	  that	  a	  state	  judge	  was	  required	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Antonin	  Scalia,	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  as	  a	  Law	  of	  Rules,	  56	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  1175	  (1989).	  	  53	  Printz	  v.	  United	  States,	  521	  U.S.	  898,	  925–33	  (1997).	  54	  Lawrence	  M.	  Solan,	  Response:	  Opportunistic	  Textualism,	  158	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.,	  PENNUMBRA	  225,	  233-­‐34	  (2010).	  	  55	  Citizens	  United	  v.	  Fed.	  Election	  Comm’n,	  558	  U.S.	  310,	  386	  (2010)	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  concurring).	  56	  Grutter	  v.	  Bollinger,	  539	  U.S.	  306,	  346	  (2003)	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  concurring).	  57	  See	  Lujan	  v.	  Defenders	  of	  Wildlife,	  504	  U.S.	  555,	  572	  (1992).	  58	  Hamdan	  v.	  Rumsfeld,	  548	  U.S.	  557,	  636	  (2006).	  59	  See	  Boumediene	  v.	  Bush,	  553	  U.S.	  723	  (2008).	  	  	  60	  Clinton	  v.	  City	  of	  New	  York,	  524	  U.S.	  417,	  438	  	  (1998).	  61	  Chevron	  U.S.A.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Natural	  Res.	  Def.	  Council,	  Inc.,	  467	  U.S.	  837,	  843–44	  (1984).	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recuse	  himself	  when	  his	  actions	  create	  a	  “probability	  of	  bias,”	  pointing	  out	  that	  this	  standard	  “fails	  to	  provide	  clear,	  workable	  guidance	  for	  future	  cases,”	  and	  then	  listing	  forty	  interpretative	  questions	  that	  the	  standard	  raises.62	  Yet	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts’	  opinion	  in	  NFIB	  v.	  Sebelius	  that	  Congress’	  commerce	  power	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  “economic	  inactivity”	  creates	  at	  least	  as	  many	  interpretative	  questions.63	  (We	  can	  think	  of	  forty-­‐one	  but	  will	  not	  list	  them.)	  	   	  
II.	  Explanations	  	   A. Naive	  Flip-­‐Flops,	  Merits	  Bias,	  and	  Motivated	  Reasoning	  	  	   1.	  Empirical	  tests.	  A	  naïve	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  one	  in	  which	  a	  person’s	  institutional	  beliefs	  depend	  on	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  person	  or	  party	  currently	  in	  power,	  or	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  substantive	  outcome	  that	  follows	  from	  a	  particular	  institutional	  configuration.	  Recall	  the	  example	  of	  a	  Democratic	  senator	  who	  supports	  aggressive	  use	  of	  the	  filibuster	  when	  the	  president	  is	  a	  Republican,	  but	  who	  deplores	  such	  use	  when	  the	  president	  is	  a	  Democrat.	  If	  the	  senator	  genuinely	  believes	  that	  the	  filibuster	  is	  legitimate	  when	  the	  president	  is	  a	  Republican,	  and	  genuinely	  believes	  that	  the	  filibuster	  is	  illegitimate	  when	  the	  president	  is	  a	  Democrat,	  then	  the	  senator	  has	  engaged	  in	  a	  naïve	  flip-­‐flop.64	  	  	   One	  might	  doubt	  whether	  the	  beliefs	  of	  real	  people	  could	  be	  so	  unstable.	  We	  conducted	  our	  own	  empirical	  test	  of	  that	  question.	  Using	  Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk,	  we	  asked	  about	  200	  people	  this	  question:	  	  
President	  Bush	  was	  often	  blocked	  by	  the	  Democratic	  Senate,	  which	  
frequently	  refused	  to	  confirm	  his	  nominees.	  Frustrated	  by	  its	  
intransigence,	  he	  resorted	  to	  "recess	  appointments,"	  which	  bypass	  the	  
Senate	  by	  installing	  nominees	  while	  the	  Senate	  is	  out	  on	  what	  President	  
Bush	  considered	  a	  "Senate	  recess."	  
	  
Do	  you	  think	  that	  President	  Bush	  did	  the	  right	  thing?	  	   A	  strong	  majority	  of	  Republicans	  (58	  percent)	  thought	  that	  he	  did.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  strong	  majority	  of	  Democrats	  thought	  that	  he	  did	  not	  (68	  percent).65	  	  We	  asked	  a	  different	  group	  of	  people	  the	  same	  question,	  with	  just	  one	  difference:	  the	  name	  “Obama”	  was	  substituted	  for	  the	  name	  “Bush.”	  With	  that	  change,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Republicans	  (89	  percent)	  opposed	  the	  recess	  appointments,	  whereas	  the	  strong	  majority	  of	  Democrats	  (66	  percent)	  supported	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Caperton	  v.	  A.T.	  Massey	  Coal	  Co.,	  556	  U.S.	  868,	  893–98	  (2009).	  63	  Nat’l	  Fed’n	  of	  Indep.	  Bus.	  v.	  Sebelius,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  2566,	  2589	  (2012).	  	  64	  Subject	  to	  a	  possible	  learning	  explanation	  that	  we	  discuss	  below.	  65	  N=200;	  p<0.01,	  meaning	  a	  high	  level	  of	  statistical	  significance.	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them.66	  Though	  the	  result	  is	  not	  unambiguous,	  the	  best	  explanation	  is	  that	  people’s	  institutional	  judgments	  were	  rooted	  in	  their	  beliefs	  about	  the	  merits.67	  	  We	  conducted	  a	  second	  empirical	  test	  using	  a	  different	  question:	  	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  attacks	  of	  9/11,	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  
sometimes	  concerned	  that	  legislation,	  enacted	  by	  Congress,	  intruded	  on	  
his	  constitutional	  authority	  in	  the	  area	  of	  national	  security.	  Bush	  issued	  
“signing	  statements,”	  which	  set	  out	  his	  own	  views.	  Some	  of	  Bush's	  
signing	  statements	  said	  that	  he	  would	  ignore	  congressional	  enactments	  
that	  did,	  in	  his	  view,	  intrude	  on	  his	  authority.	  
	  
Do	  you	  approve	  of	  such	  signing	  statements?	  	  This	  time	  only	  37	  percent	  of	  Republicans	  said	  that	  they	  approved	  of	  signing	  statements	  –	  perhaps	  because	  of	  the	  current	  unpopularity	  of	  President	  Bush	  (even	  among	  Republicans),	  or	  perhaps	  because	  of	  a	  general	  concern,	  among	  Republicans	  during	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  about	  presidential	  overreaching.	  But	  this	  was	  considerably	  more	  than	  the	  20	  percent	  of	  Democrats	  who	  said	  they	  approved	  of	  signing	  statements.68	  	  When	  the	  same	  question	  was	  asked	  about	  Obama	  rather	  than	  Bush,	  the	  difference	  became	  very	  stark:	  68	  percent	  of	  Democrats	  said	  they	  approved	  of	  signing	  statements,	  while	  only	  16	  percent	  of	  Republicans	  approved	  of	  signing	  statements.69	  As	  before,	  with	  both	  parties,	  a	  person	  was	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  an	  institutional	  practice	  (signing	  statements)	  if	  it	  benefited	  a	  same-­‐party	  president.	  While,	  unlike	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  a	  majority	  of	  Republicans	  rejected	  signing	  statements	  even	  when	  Bush	  used	  them,	  our	  results	  nonetheless	  show	  flip-­‐flopping	  among	  numerous	  Republicans	  as	  well	  as	  Democrats.	  	  Turning	  to	  constitutional	  law,	  we	  asked	  a	  large	  group	  of	  subjects	  the	  following	  questions:	  (1)	  Do	  you	  support	  same-­‐sex	  marriage?	  (2)	  Do	  you	  believe	  that	  the	  Constitution	  permits	  Congress	  to	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  throughout	  the	  country?	  The	  first	  question	  calls	  for	  a	  substantive	  judgment;	  the	  second	  calls	  for	  an	  institutional	  judgment	  with	  a	  constitutional	  foundation.	  Our	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  people	  who	  support	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  will	  believe	  that	  Congress	  cannot	  ban	  it,	  and	  that	  people	  who	  oppose	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  will	  believe	  that	  Congress	  can	  ban	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  N=230;	  p<0.01.	  67	  The	  reason	  that	  the	  result	  is	  not	  ambiguous	  is	  that	  the	  words	  “the	  right	  thing”	  can	  be	  taken	  in	  more	  than	  one	  way.	  Some	  respondents	  might	  have	  thought	  that	  the	  question	  invited	  a	  substantive	  judgment,	  rather	  than	  an	  institutional	  one.	  But	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  question	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  an	  institutional	  judgment	  was	  sought.	  68	  N=203;	  p<0.01.	  69	  N=239;	  p<0.01.	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The	  results	  strongly	  support	  this	  hypothesis.	  Among	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  supporters,	  only	  10	  percent	  believed	  that	  Congress	  could	  ban	  it;	  90	  percent	  believed	  that	  Congress	  could	  not	  ban	  it.	  Among	  opponents,	  49	  percent	  believed	  that	  Congress	  could	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage;	  51	  percent	  believed	  that	  Congress	  could	  not	  ban	  it.70	  	  We	  also	  asked	  the	  inverse	  of	  question	  (2),	  namely,	  do	  you	  believe	  that	  the	  Constitution	  permits	  Congress	  to	  require	  all	  states	  to	  recognize	  same-­‐sex	  marriage?	  Again,	  supporters	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  Congress	  possesses	  this	  power	  (69%)	  than	  opponents	  (6%).71	  	  2.	  Motivated	  reasoning	  and	  institutional	  judgments.	  We	  interpret	  these	  results	  to	  mean	  that	  people’s	  views	  on	  the	  merits	  influence	  and	  sometimes	  decide	  their	  positions	  on	  institutional	  questions.	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  George	  W.	  Bush	  had	  the	  legal	  power	  to	  make	  recess	  appointments	  or	  issue	  signing	  statements	  than	  Barack	  Obama	  does,	  because	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  trust	  Bush	  to	  use	  those	  powers	  wisely.	  Democrats	  thought	  similarly.	  People’s	  view	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  strongly	  influences	  their	  positions	  on	  the	  institutional	  question	  of	  congressional	  power.	  	  We	  suggest	  that	  naïve	  flip-­‐flops	  reflect	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  merits	  bias,	  through	  which	  people	  sincerely	  accept	  an	  institutional	  position	  that	  fits	  with	  their	  substantive	  commitments.72	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  institutional	  position	  is	  motivated	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	  product	  of	  those	  commitments;	  but	  agents	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  that	  fact.	  If,	  for	  example,	  members	  of	  Congress	  are	  genuinely	  hostile	  to	  the	  incumbent	  president,	  and	  believe	  that	  his	  own	  positions	  are	  threatening	  to	  freedom	  and	  self-­‐government,	  they	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  accept,	  and	  even	  to	  find	  self-­‐evident,	  an	  institutional	  position	  that	  fits	  with	  those	  views.	  But	  if	  they	  trust	  that	  president	  –	  if,	  for	  example,	  Democratic	  senators	  are	  asked	  whether	  they	  want	  to	  deny	  authority	  to	  a	  Democratic	  president	  –	  that	  same	  institutional	  	  position	  might	  seem	  preposterous.	  If	  a	  Democratic	  president	  acts	  unilaterally,	  Democratic	  legislators	  might	  think	  that	  he	  is	  reasonably	  exercising	  his	  authority	  in	  the	  fact	  of	  a	  “broken	  system.”	  But	  if	  a	  Republican	  president	  acts	  unilaterally,	  Democratic	  senators	  might	  insist	  that	  he	  is	  violating	  the	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances.	  In	  fact,	  both	  the	  flip	  and	  the	  flop	  might	  seem	  self-­‐evidently	  correct.	  	  Similarly,	  when	  people	  believe	  that	  Congress	  supports	  their	  views	  (about	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  abortion	  rights,	  and	  so	  on)	  and	  the	  states	  do	  not,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  reject	  objections	  to	  national	  legislation	  based	  on	  federalism.	  When	  people	  believe	  that	  the	  states	  take	  their	  views	  more	  seriously,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  invoke	  federalism	  as	  a	  reason	  that	  Congress	  should	  not	  override	  state	  law.	  	  In	  our	  view,	  merits	  bias	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  N=200;	  p<0.01;	  using	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  71	  N=201;	  p<0.01;	  using	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  
72 As discussed below, any judgment about an institutional issue must, in the end, turn on some kind of 
substantive judgment. We are understanding the idea of “substantive commitments” in a narrower sense – 
not as connoting an ultimate justification for an institutional arrangement, but as separate and often short-
term commitments, to some kind of outcome, that influence an institutional judgment. 
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pervasive	  in	  politics	  and	  law,	  and	  it	  helps	  to	  account	  for	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  and	  other	  puzzling	  judgments,	  plausibly	  including	  the	  majority	  opinion	  in	  Bush	  v.	  Gore.73	  	   Merits	  bias	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  psychological	  research,	  emphasizing	  the	  pervasive	  role	  of	  motivated	  reasoning.74	  If,	  for	  example,	  fans	  of	  a	  particular	  football	  team	  –	  say,	  the	  New	  England	  Patriots	  –	  watch	  a	  game,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  systematically	  biased	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  referee’s	  neutrality.75	  Typically	  they	  will	  see	  the	  referee	  as	  favoring	  the	  opposing	  team.76	  Their	  judgment	  to	  this	  effect	  is	  entirely	  sincere,	  even	  though	  they	  would	  have	  a	  quite	  different	  assessment	  if	  they	  rooted	  for	  that	  opposing	  team.	  Notably,	  they	  are	  blind	  to	  their	  own	  bias.77	  Motivated	  reasoning	  can	  be	  found	  in	  countless	  contexts,	  including	  politics	  and	  law.78	  What	  we	  are	  suggesting	  here	  is	  that	  people’s	  assessment	  of	  institutional	  issues	  is	  often	  motivated	  as	  well.	  	  	   Related	  research	  finds	  that	  people’s	  willingness	  to	  accept	  outcomes,	  based	  on	  institutional	  legitimacy,	  is	  overridden	  when	  those	  outcomes	  are	  truly	  objectionable.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  “right”	  institution	  reached	  that	  outcome	  drops	  out	  as	  a	  normative	  consideration.	  79	  Similarly,	  people	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  the	  substantive	  valence,	  not	  institutional	  considerations,	  in	  deciding	  whether	  Congress	  or	  instead	  courts	  should	  produce	  certain	  outcomes.80	  When	  people	  care	  greatly	  about	  the	  substance,	  their	  institutional	  judgments	  do	  not	  much	  matter.81	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  531	  U.S.	  98	  (2000).	  74	  See,	  e.g.,	  Charles	  G.	  Lord,	  Lee	  Ross,	  &	  Mark	  R.	  Lepper,	  Biased	  Assimilation	  and	  Attitude	  Polarization:	  The	  effects	  of	  Prior	  Theories	  on	  Subsequently	  Considered	  Evidence.	  37	  J.	  PERSONALITY	  &	  SOC.	  PSYCHOL.,	  2098-­‐2109	  (1979);	  Diana	  C.	  Mutz,	  Political	  Psychology	  and	  Choice,	  in	  THE	  OXFORD	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  POLITICAL	  BEHAVIOR	  80	  (Russell	  J.	  Dalton	  &	  Hans-­‐Dieter	  Klingerman,	  eds.,	  2007);	  Ziva	  Kunda,	  The	  Case	  
for	  Motivated	  Reasoning,	  108	  PSYCHOL.	  BULL.	  480	  (1990).	  75	  For	  the	  seminal	  study	  demonstrating	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  this	  sort,	  see	  Albert	  H.	  Hastorf	  &	  Hadley	  Cantril,	  They	  Saw	  a	  Game:	  A	  Case	  Study,	  49	  J.	  ABNORMAL	  &	  SOC.	  PSYCHOL.	  129	  (1954).	  	  See	  also	  Kunda,	  
supra	  note	  75,	  at	  488	  (fans	  of	  winning	  and	  losing	  team	  assign	  different	  interpretations	  to	  a	  “fluke”	  event	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  game).	  See	  also	  Samuel	  McNerney,	  Cognitive	  Biases	  in	  Sports:	  The	  
Irrationality	  of	  Coaches,	  Commentators,	  and	  Fans,	  Sci.	  Am.	  Guest	  Blog,	  Sept.	  22,	  2011,	  http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-­‐blog/2011/09/22/cognitive-­‐biases-­‐in-­‐sports-­‐the-­‐irrationality-­‐of-­‐coaches-­‐commentators-­‐and-­‐fans/.	  76	  Id.	  77	  See,	  e.g.,	  Emily	  Pronin,	  Daniel	  Y.	  Lin,	  &	  Lee	  Ross,	  The	  Bias	  Blind	  Spot:	  Perception	  of	  Bias	  in	  Self	  Versus	  
Others,	  28	  PERSONALITY	  &	  SOC.	  PSYCHOL.	  BULL.	  369	  (2002).	  78	  See	  Daniel	  M.	  Kahan,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  2010	  Term	  –	  Foreword:	  Neutral	  Principles,	  Motivated	  
Cognition,	  and	  Some	  Problems	  for	  Constitutional	  Law,	  125	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  19-­‐26	  (2011).	  79	  See,	  e.g.,	  Linda	  J.	  Skitka,	  Christopher	  W.	  Bauman,	  &	  Brad	  L.	  Lytle,	  Limits	  on	  Legitimacy:	  Moral	  and	  
Religious	  Convictions	  as	  Constraints	  on	  Deference	  to	  Authority,	  97	  J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.	  567	  (2009);	  Christoper	  W.	  Bauman	  &	  Linda	  J.	  Skitka,	  Moral	  Disagreement	  and	  Procedural	  Justice:	  Moral	  
Mandates	  as	  Constraints	  to	  Voice	  Effects,	  61	  AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL.	  40	  (2009).	  	  80	  See	  David	  Fontana	  &	  Donald	  Braman,	  Judicial	  Backlash	  or	  Just	  Backlash?	  Evidence	  from	  a	  National	  
Experiment,	  112	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  731	  (2012).	  Fontana	  &	  Braman’s	  findings—that	  people’s	  cultural	  priors,	  rather	  than	  their	  institutional	  preferences,	  determine	  their	  support	  for	  political	  outcomes—could	  also	  explain	  certain	  kinds	  of	  flip-­‐flopping.	  81	  We	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  possible,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  logic,	  that	  the	  causal	  direction	  could	  go	  the	  other	  way.	  People	  start	  off	  with	  a	  strong	  position	  about	  how	  much	  Congress	  can	  legislate	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   3.	  An	  analogy.	  Consider	  an	  analogy,	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  party	  affiliation	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  heuristic.82	  In	  a	  relevant	  study,	  people	  –	  both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  -­‐-­‐	  were	  asked	  their	  views	  about	  several	  issues	  involving	  welfare	  reform	  and	  related	  issues.	  In	  one	  experiment,	  they	  were	  asked	  whether	  they	  favored	  a	  generous	  welfare	  policy	  (with	  high	  levels	  of	  benefits)	  or	  a	  strict	  policy	  (with	  much	  lower	  levels	  of	  benefits).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  obtain	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  members	  of	  both	  parties	  thought	  about	  those	  issues.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  Democrats	  tended	  to	  favor	  the	  generous	  policy,	  while	  Republicans	  tended	  to	  favor	  the	  strict	  policy.83	  	  Otherwise	  identical	  groups	  were	  then	  asked	  about	  the	  same	  issues,	  but	  with	  one	  difference:	  They	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  views	  of	  party	  leadership.	  The	  effect	  of	  that	  information	  was	  significant.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  policy	  was	  generous	  or	  stringent,	  Democrats	  tended	  to	  favor	  that	  policy	  if	  they	  were	  told	  that	  it	  was	  favored	  by	  Democratic	  leadership.84	  Republicans	  showed	  the	  same	  pattern.85	  Armed	  with	  information	  about	  the	  views	  of	  their	  party’s	  leadership,	  people	  departed	  from	  the	  views	  that	  they	  would	  have	  held	  if	  they	  had	  not	  been	  so	  armed.	  Stunningly,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  information	  “overwhelmed	  the	  impact	  of	  both	  the	  policy’s	  objective	  impact	  and	  participants’	  ideological	  beliefs.”86	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  people	  were	  blind	  
to	  that	  impact;	  they	  actually	  said	  that	  their	  judgments	  were	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  merits,	  not	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  learning	  about	  the	  beliefs	  of	  party	  leaders.87	  Here,	  then,	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  party	  affiliation	  for	  people’s	  judgments	  –	  and	  of	  people’s	  unawareness	  of	  that	  fact.	  	   This	  is	  an	  analogy,	  not	  an	  identity.	  Many	  people	  do	  take	  the	  views	  of	  party	  leadership	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  heuristic,	  overwhelming	  their	  own	  private	  judgments.	  Use	  of	  the	  “party	  heuristic”	  might	  be	  purely	  cognitive	  (even	  if	  it	  is	  relatively	  automatic),	  and	  it	  need	  not	  involve	  any	  kind	  of	  motivated	  reasoning.	  With	  merits	  bias,	  by	  contrast,	  people	  resolve	  hard	  institutional	  questions,	  on	  which	  they	  may	  have	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  about	  marriage,	  and	  this	  position	  influences	  their	  beliefs	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  people	  suffer	  from	  a	  cognitive	  bias	  that	  causes	  their	  abstract	  commitments	  to	  congressional	  power	  or	  federalism	  to	  influence	  their	  views	  about	  substantive	  issues	  like	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  abortion,	  and	  the	  like.	  This	  interpretation	  strikes	  us	  as	  deeply	  implausible	  for	  a	  simple	  reason:	  Most	  institutional	  commitments	  (for	  example,	  a	  belief	  that	  Congress	  can	  overrule	  the	  states	  on	  marriage)	  imply	  exactly	  nothing	  about	  one’s	  substantive	  views	  (for	  or	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  abortion	  rights,	  the	  death	  penalty,	  minimum	  wage	  laws).	  82	  Geoffrey	  Cohen,	  Party	  Over	  Policy,	  85	  J.	  PERSONALITY	  AND	  SOC.	  PSYCHOL.	  808	  (2003).	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  paper	  that	  surveys	  the	  literature	  and	  offers	  additional	  experimental	  results,	  see	  John	  G.	  Bullock,	  Elite	  
Influence	  on	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  an	  Informed	  Electorate,	  105	  AMER.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  496	  (2011)	  (finding	  that	  cues	  from	  party	  elites	  do	  not	  fully	  displace	  people’s	  reliance	  on	  information	  about	  policies).	  83	  Cohen,	  supra	  note	  83,	  at	  812.	  84	  Id.	  at	  811.	  85	  Id.	  86	  Id.	  at	  808.	  87	  Id.	  at	  809.	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particular	  views,	  by	  reference	  to	  their	  substantive	  commitments.	  What	  links	  the	  party	  findings	  with	  merits	  bias	  is	  a	  similar	  blindness,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  agents,	  to	  the	  source	  of	  their	  own	  judgments.	  	  	  4.	  Substantive	  flip-­‐flopping	  vs.	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping.	  We	  might	  call	  someone	  a	  “substantive	  flip-­‐flopper”	  if,	  for	  example,	  she	  believes	  that	  the	  death	  penalty	  is	  just	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  party	  leadership	  believes	  that	  the	  death	  penalty	  is	  just	  –	  and	  if	  she	  flips	  when	  and	  because	  party	  leadership	  does	  so.	  A	  naïve	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopper	  believes	  that	  (say)	  the	  filibuster	  is	  legitimate	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  party	  leadership	  believes	  (or	  says)	  that	  it	  is	  legitimate;	  or,	  possibly,	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  filibuster	  advances	  the	  implementation	  of	  her	  substantive	  views	  in	  particular	  cases.	  (For	  example,	  such	  a	  flip-­‐flopper	  might	  generally	  believe	  that	  the	  Senate	  should	  defer	  to	  the	  President’s	  choice	  of	  executive	  branch	  nominees,	  but	  might	  flip	  because	  of	  her	  strong	  views	  on	  civil	  rights.)	  	  	  The	  latter	  case	  can	  produce	  flip-­‐flopping	  that	  exceeds	  the	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  leadership.	  The	  naïve	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopper	  might	  support	  the	  filibuster	  today	  because	  it	  blocks	  a	  judicial	  nominee	  of	  whom	  she	  disapproves,	  and	  then	  oppose	  the	  filibuster	  tomorrow	  because	  it	  blocks	  a	  new	  health	  care	  bill	  that	  she	  likes.	  	  	   We	  suspect	  that	  naïve	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  more	  common	  than	  naïve	  substantive	  flip-­‐flopping.	  At	  least	  on	  the	  very	  largest	  issues,	  people’s	  substantive	  views	  are	  not	  highly	  malleable,	  and	  on	  such	  issues,	  they	  may	  well	  be	  impervious	  even	  to	  reports	  about	  the	  views	  of	  party	  leadership.88	  Most	  people	  who	  oppose	  the	  death	  penalty	  will	  continue	  to	  oppose	  it	  even	  if	  the	  party	  changes	  its	  mind.89	  By	  contrast,	  institutional	  values	  are	  far	  less	  robust,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  trigger	  immediate	  or	  strongly	  held	  reactions	  in	  the	  abstract,	  tend	  to	  be	  derivative	  of	  substantive	  views,	  and	  often	  depend	  on	  complex	  tradeoffs.	  	  	   Of	  course	  it	  is	  true	  that	  some	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  palpable	  inconsistencies	  and	  might	  produce	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  embarrassment	  in	  the	  agent	  (who	  might	  have	  to	  offer	  an	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  learning).	  But	  sometimes	  the	  embarrassment	  is	  tolerable	  (for	  reasons	  explained	  below90)	  and	  sometimes	  it	  is	  avoidable.	  In	  our	  example	  above,	  the	  flip-­‐flopper	  might	  be	  able	  to	  reason	  to	  herself	  that	  different	  values	  are	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  case	  of	  nominations	  and	  statutes,	  and	  so	  her	  changing	  position	  about	  the	  filibuster	  is	  not	  really	  inconsistent.	  	   	  B.	  Tactical	  Flip-­‐Flops	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  One	  of	  the	  present	  authors	  (Sunstein)	  is	  engaged	  in	  empirical	  research	  (with	  Todd	  Rogers	  and	  Edward	  Glaeser)	  that	  supports	  this	  claim.	  89	  The	  theory	  of	  “cultural	  cognition”	  explains	  how	  one’s	  political	  beliefs	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  death	  penalty	  and	  environmental	  protection	  are	  derived	  from	  one’s	  cultural	  worldview,	  which	  precedes	  party	  affiliation.	  	  Dan	  M.	  Kahan,	  Cultural	  Cognition	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  24	  YALE	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  REV.	  147,	  147–48	  	  90	  See	  infra.	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   1.	  Definition.	  A	  tactical	  flip-­‐flop	  takes	  place	  when	  an	  agent	  knowingly	  (as	  opposed	  to	  naively)	  changes	  institutional	  positions	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  tactical	  advantage.	  Merits	  bias	  is	  not	  involved.	  Tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  may	  be	  cynical;	  institutional	  arguments	  might	  be	  invoked	  for	  purely	  strategic	  or	  opportunistic	  reasons.	  The	  agent	  recognizes	  that	  her	  credibility	  may	  suffer	  but	  believes	  that	  the	  tactical	  gain	  outweighs	  any	  long-­‐term	  loss.	  She	  might	  believe	  that	  people’s	  memories	  are	  short	  and	  hence	  that	  she	  has	  little	  to	  lose	  from	  the	  flip-­‐flop.	  Or	  she	  might	  believe	  that	  the	  relevant	  audience	  consists	  mainly	  of	  naïve	  flip-­‐floppers	  who	  will	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  agent’s	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  tactical.	  	   Use	  of	  institutional	  arguments	  can	  be	  good	  strategy.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  if	  an	  agent	  invokes	  an	  institutional	  or	  legal	  position	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  merits,	  she	  might	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  agreement	  from	  people	  who	  fiercely	  disagree	  with	  her	  on	  matters	  of	  substance	  or	  politics.	  For	  example,	  a	  lawyer	  might	  persuade	  judges,	  or	  a	  judge	  might	  persuade	  colleagues,	  to	  vote	  to	  uphold	  an	  agency’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  under	  the	  Chevron	  principle91	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  thus	  bracket	  disagreements	  that	  might	  break	  out	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  principles.92	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  if	  an	  institutional	  position	  is	  held	  only	  for	  tactical	  reasons,	  there	  is	  a	  pervasive	  risk	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  and	  hence	  a	  loss	  of	  credibility.	  	  	   2.	  Politics.	  Tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  politics.	  Recall	  that	  when	  Republicans	  hold	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  Senate,	  many	  of	  them	  decry	  the	  use	  of	  the	  filibuster	  by	  the	  Democratic	  majority,	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  antidemocratic;93	  but	  when	  Republicans	  are	  in	  the	  minority,	  many	  of	  them	  claim	  that	  the	  filibuster	  is	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  Senate’s	  traditions.94	  Many	  Democrats	  make	  exactly	  the	  same	  arguments	  according	  to	  their	  position	  as	  majority	  or	  minority	  party.	  We	  have	  given	  other	  examples	  of	  this	  phenomenon—recess	  appointments,	  court-­‐packing,	  signing	  statements,	  unilateral	  executive	  action,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  some	  such	  cases,	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  naïve,	  but	  in	  others,	  it	  is	  tactical.	  While	  legislators	  self-­‐consciously	  invoke	  institutional	  considerations,	  they	  do	  so	  opportunistically,	  seeking	  to	  enlist	  some	  apparently	  principled	  argument	  (about	  checks	  and	  balances	  or	  the	  need	  to	  break	  a	  logjam)	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  substantive	  goal,	  which	  is	  all	  that	  they	  really	  care	  about.	  	  	  	   Some	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  in	  a	  sense	  shameless,	  but	  others	  are	  more	  subtle.	  Suppose	  that	  a	  leader	  of	  a	  political	  party	  wants	  to	  attack	  a	  policy	  initiative	  from	  the	  president,	  who	  is	  from	  the	  opposing	  party.	  Suppose	  too	  that	  the	  substantive	  issue	  (immigrations,	  relations	  with	  Cuba,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  climate	  change)	  is	  one	  on	  which	  the	  leader’s	  own	  party	  is	  divided.	  The	  leader	  might	  press	  an	  institutional	  claim	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  building	  a	  large	  coalition.	  Some	  members	  might	  be	  far	  more	  willing	  to	  agree	  that	  “the	  president	  has	  exceeded	  his	  authority”	  than	  that	  “the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  See	  Chevron	  v.	  Natural	  Res.	  Def.	  Council,	  467	  U.S.	  837	  (1984).	  92	  See	  King	  v.	  Burwell,	  759	  F.3d	  358	  (4th	  Cir.	  2014),	  cert.	  granted,	  No.	  14-­‐114,	  2014	  WL	  3817533	  (U.S.	  Nov.	  7,	  2014).	  93	  See,	  e.g.,	  Hulse,	  supra	  note	  1.	  94	  See,	  e.g.,	  Peters,	  supra	  note	  2.	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president’s	  policy	  preferences	  are	  objectionable.”	  To	  be	  sure,	  such	  members	  would	  be,	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  immune	  from	  merits	  bias.	  But	  we	  could	  easily	  imagine	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  party	  leader	  attempts	  to	  enlist	  people	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  press	  a	  claim	  about	  institutional	  overreaching	  alongside	  those	  who	  object	  to	  the	  president’s	  action	  on	  the	  merits.	  	   	  	   Tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  easy	  to	  understand,	  certainly	  within	  the	  political	  domain.	  (We	  will	  see	  that	  the	  judicial	  context	  is	  more	  complex.)	  The	  overriding	  concern	  of	  individual	  legislators	  is	  to	  be	  reelected,95	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  each	  party	  is	  to	  control	  the	  government.96	  If	  legislators	  want	  to	  be	  reelected,	  it	  might	  well	  be	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  reject	  the	  initiatives	  of	  a	  president	  of	  an	  opposing	  party,	  lest	  they	  be	  accused	  of	  capitulation	  (and	  render	  themselves	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  primary	  challenge).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  legislators	  face	  a	  number	  of	  pressures,	  electoral	  and	  otherwise,	  to	  support	  the	  initiatives	  of	  a	  president	  of	  the	  same	  party.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  electoral	  self-­‐interest	  of	  individual	  legislators	  will	  sometimes	  lead	  them	  to	  support	  a	  president	  of	  the	  opposing	  party	  or	  to	  oppose	  a	  president	  of	  the	  same	  party;	  but	  the	  general	  tendency	  is	  clear.	  A	  Republican	  member	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  a	  majority	  Republican	  district	  is	  unlikely	  to	  have	  much	  to	  gain	  by	  supporting	  a	  Democratic	  president,	  and	  might	  have	  something	  to	  lose.	  	   Some	  members	  of	  Congress	  are	  partisans,	  either	  by	  choice	  or	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  exerted	  by	  party	  leadership.	  To	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree,	  they	  want	  to	  maximize	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  own	  party.	  To	  partisans,	  of	  course,	  the	  ideal	  world	  is	  one	  in	  which	  their	  party	  exercises	  full	  control	  when	  it	  holds	  the	  majority	  and	  can	  block	  the	  other	  party’s	  attempt	  to	  govern	  when	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  the	  majority.	  Thus,	  partisans	  routinely	  advance	  generous	  interpretations	  of	  institutional	  constraints	  when	  out	  of	  power	  and	  narrow	  interpretations	  when	  in	  power.	  	  	   Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  president	  makes	  a	  series	  of	  recess	  appointments	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  people	  reasonably	  dispute	  the	  question	  whether	  he	  has	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  do	  so.	  Most	  people	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  clear	  views	  on	  the	  underlying	  question.	  The	  underlying	  issues	  are	  highly	  technical,	  and	  without	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  work,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  end	  up	  with	  a	  firm	  conviction.	  To	  be	  sure,	  dedicated	  guardians	  of	  legislative	  power,	  taken	  as	  such,	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  advice	  and	  consent;	  they	  might	  have	  an	  institutional	  conviction	  that	  outruns	  short-­‐run	  considerations	  about	  whether	  a	  particular	  president	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  his	  preferred	  people	  are	  in	  place.	  And	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  some	  legislators	  who	  have	  had	  some	  convictions.97	  But	  in	  light	  of	  the	  standard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  DAVID	  R.	  MAYHEW,	  CONGRESS:	  THE	  ELECTORAL	  CONNECTION	  (1974).	  96	  See	  GARY	  W.	  COX	  &	  MATHEW	  D.	  MCCUBBINS,	  SETTING	  THE	  AGENDA:	  RESPONSIBLE	  PARTY	  GOVERNMENT	  IN	  THE	  U.S.	  HOUSE	  OF	  REPRESENTATIVES	  (2005).	  97	  For	  example,	  Senator	  Robert	  Byrd	  was	  a	  committed	  “champion	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch,”	  who	  opposed	  both	  Congress’s	  granting	  line-­‐item	  veto	  power	  to	  the	  President	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  without	  congressional	  declaration	  of	  war	  because	  he	  believed	  both	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  government	  structure	  established	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  	  See	  Adam	  Clymer,	  Robert	  C.	  Byrd,	  a	  Pillar	  of	  the	  Senate,	  Dies	  
at	  92,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  June	  28,	  2010,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/us/politics/29byrd.html.	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incentives	  faced	  by	  those	  who	  run	  for	  public	  office,	  and	  who	  seek	  to	  keep	  their	  jobs,	  it	  is	  highly	  unusual	  to	  emphasize,	  and	  to	  stand	  by,	  such	  convictions.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  tactical	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  not	  exactly	  surprising.	  	  	   From	  another	  perspective,	  however,	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  also	  puzzling.	  The	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  so	  common	  that	  one	  might	  wonder	  why	  anyone	  ever	  believes	  these	  institutional	  arguments—and	  if	  no	  one	  believes	  them,	  why	  politicians	  would	  ever	  both	  to	  make	  them.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  no	  one	  believes	  them;	  it	  is	  all	  theater	  or	  “cheap	  talk,”98	  similar	  to	  polite	  conversation.	  But	  there	  is	  another	  possibility,	  which	  is	  that	  many	  people	  (including	  many	  voters)	  have	  short	  memories,	  and	  the	  sheer	  plausibility	  of	  an	  institutional	  argument,	  on	  the	  merits,	  can	  ensure	  that	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  ineffective.	  	  	   If	  Republican	  legislators	  decry	  the	  “imperial	  presidency”	  during	  a	  Democratic	  administration,	  and	  if	  their	  objections	  have	  apparent	  force,	  it	  might	  not	  much	  matter	  that	  they	  defended	  (similar)	  presidential	  authority	  under	  a	  Republican	  administration.	  And	  even	  if	  no	  one	  is	  actually	  persuaded	  by	  their	  objections,	  at	  least	  they	  might	  have	  the	  functions	  of	  intensifying	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  like-­‐minded	  and	  appealing	  to	  the	  beliefs	  of	  constituents.	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  it	  might	  well	  be	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  many	  legislators	  to	  flip	  at	  Time	  1	  and	  to	  flop	  at	  Time	  2.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  individual	  agents,	  the	  benefits	  of	  both	  actions	  exceed	  their	  costs.	  The	  benefits	  of	  the	  initial	  flip	  are	  clear,	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  flop	  might	  be	  small	  or	  even	  zero.	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  institutional	  arguments	  sometimes	  do	  exert	  some	  force	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  usually	  not	  a	  large	  amount,	  at	  least	  when	  the	  underlying	  question	  are	  genuinely	  difficult.	  Senators	  from	  both	  parties,	  for	  example,	  jointly	  benefit	  from	  common	  institutional	  rules	  that	  protect	  political	  minorities.	  A	  current	  majority	  is	  aware	  that	  if	  it	  adopts	  rules	  that	  greatly	  weaken	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  current	  minority,	  it	  might	  itself	  be	  disempowered	  in	  the	  future.	  And	  legislators	  of	  both	  sides	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  some	  respect	  for	  the	  traditional	  institutional	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  national	  legislature,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  it	  will	  preserve	  a	  “core”	  of	  those	  prerogatives.	  “Turf	  protection”	  can	  sometimes	  unite	  legislators	  across	  partisan	  lines,	  reducing	  flip-­‐flops.	  	  It	  is	  a	  nice	  question	  how	  a	  degree	  of	  institutional	  self-­‐protection	  interacts	  with	  the	  electoral	  concerns	  of	  individual	  legislators;	  we	  could	  easily	  imagine	  and	  even	  find	  cases	  in	  which	  electoral	  self-­‐interest	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  little	  interest	  in	  institutional	  questions,	  even	  within	  the	  “core.”	  (Imagine	  cases	  of	  recent	  attacks	  on	  the	  United	  States,	  where	  broad	  delegation	  to	  the	  executive	  might	  be	  what	  voters	  want.)	  But	  some	  common	  understandings	  provide	  a	  degree	  of	  constraint,	  and	  thus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  In	  game	  theory,	  “cheap	  talk”	  refers	  to	  communication	  among	  players	  with	  no	  direct	  cost	  in	  the	  game.	  	  See	  Vincent	  Crawford,	  A	  Survey	  of	  Experiments	  on	  Communication	  via	  Cheap	  Talk,	  78	  J.	  ECON.	  THEORY	  286	  (1998).	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can	  be	  meaningfully	  invoked	  in	  debate,	  even	  if	  they	  exert	  influence	  only	  on	  the	  margin.	  	  	   3.	  Courts.	  Clear	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  much	  less	  visible	  in	  the	  courts	  than	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  but	  the	  concept	  is	  not	  unfamiliar	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  can	  sometimes	  be	  found	  within	  the	  legal	  system.	  To	  take	  an	  admittedly	  extreme	  allegation,	  begin	  with	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  where	  some	  people	  flatly	  accuse	  the	  majority	  of	  ruling	  for	  Bush	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  next	  several	  appointments	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  would	  be	  Republicans.99	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  Republican	  justices	  who	  voted	  for	  Bush	  feared	  becoming	  a	  minority	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Gore	  appointments	  over	  the	  next	  four	  to	  eight	  years,	  and	  thus	  losing	  their	  power	  to	  shape	  American	  law.	  The	  justices	  were	  willing	  to	  lose	  some	  credibility,	  to	  adopt	  an	  adventurous	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause,	  or	  relax	  their	  commitment	  to	  federalism,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  had	  enough	  power	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  their	  legal	  and	  ideological	  goals	  another	  day.	  	  	   We	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  endorse	  this	  set	  of	  claims,	  which	  we	  think	  unfair,	  accusatory,	  and	  wrong.	  But	  we	  suspect	  that	  within	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  much	  more	  common	  than	  generally	  recognized,	  albeit	  less	  dramatic	  (and	  far	  more	  interesting)	  than	  the	  alleged	  tactical	  flip-­‐flop	  in	  Bush	  v.	  Gore.	  One	  likely	  reason	  that	  justices	  are	  unable	  to	  make	  fully	  consistent	  institutional	  arguments	  in	  all	  opinions	  that	  they	  join	  is	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  form	  majorities	  with	  justices	  who	  may	  agree	  on	  the	  outcome	  but	  disagree	  with	  the	  reasoning.	  A	  justice	  who	  does	  not	  have	  a	  weak	  commitment	  to	  federalism,	  or	  who	  is	  unenthusiastic	  about	  originalism,	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  join	  an	  opinion	  that	  shows	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  federalism,	  or	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  originalism,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  preventing	  undue	  splintering	  within	  the	  Court.	  It	  is	  common	  for	  judges	  or	  justices	  to	  join	  opinions	  with	  which	  they	  do	  not	  wholly	  agree,	  and	  the	  result	  can	  be	  a	  degree	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping	  from	  one	  case	  to	  another.	  	  	  Judicial	  opinions	  often	  reflect	  incompletely	  theorized	  agreements,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  low-­‐level	  principles	  on	  which	  diverse	  people	  can	  agree,	  notwithstanding	  their	  disagreement	  on	  fundamental	  issues.100	  When	  incompletely	  theorized	  agreements	  are	  in	  place,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  flip-­‐flopping.	  But	  sometimes	  incomplete	  theorization	  is	  not	  possible,	  perhaps	  because	  it	  is	  insufficient	  to	  resolve	  the	  relevant	  controversy,	  perhaps	  because	  some	  members	  of	  the	  winning	  coalition	  want	  to	  offer	  some	  reasoning	  with	  which	  other	  members	  do	  not	  fully	  agree.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  opinion	  might	  not	  fully	  reflect	  the	  views	  of	  all	  those	  who	  join	  it,	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  will	  eventually	  follow.	  	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  in	  Windsor,	  Justice	  X	  believed	  that	  DOMA	  was	  unconstitutional	  at	  least	  in	  part	  on	  federalism	  grounds	  while	  Justice	  Y	  believed	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jack	  M.	  Balkin,	  Bush	  v.	  Gore	  and	  the	  Boundary	  Between	  Law	  and	  Politics,	  110	  YALE	  L.J.	  1407,	  1407-­‐09	  (2001).	  100	  See	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Incompletely	  Theorized	  Agreements,	  108	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1733	  (1995).	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DOMA	  was	  unconstitutional	  entirely	  on	  Equal	  Protection	  grounds	  (and	  hence	  that	  federalism	  was	  irrelevant).	  Perhaps	  Justice	  X	  was	  assigned	  the	  opinion,	  and	  Justice	  Y	  wished	  to	  avoid	  writing	  a	  concurrence	  because	  she	  did	  not	  want	  to	  complicate	  the	  law,	  or	  increase	  uncertainty,	  and	  perhaps	  also	  feared	  that	  X	  might	  flip	  his	  vote	  (or	  perhaps	  would	  similarly	  refuse	  to	  join	  X’s	  opinions	  in	  future	  cases).	  Accordingly,	  Justice	  Y	  joins	  an	  opinion	  whose	  reasoning	  may	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  another	  opinion	  written	  by	  Justice	  Y,	  resulting	  in	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  flip-­‐flop,	  and	  indeed	  is	  a	  tactical	  flip-­‐flop.	  Justice	  Y	  suppresses	  her	  reasoning	  and	  takes	  a	  possible	  hit	  to	  her	  reputation	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  stability	  and	  comity	  within	  the	  Court	  and	  her	  relationship	  with	  Justice	  X	  (enabling	  Justice	  Y	  to	  exert	  greater	  influence	  on	  the	  law	  in	  some	  future	  case).	  If	  so,	  Justice	  Y	  will	  engage	  in	  tactical	  flip-­‐flopping,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  she	  has	  committed	  herself	  to	  a	  view	  with	  which	  she	  does	  not	  fully	  agree,	  and	  from	  which	  she	  will	  retreat	  in	  time.	  	   C.	  Non-­‐Flip-­‐Flops	  	  	   Many	  cases	  of	  alleged	  or	  apparent	  flip-­‐flopping	  are	  nothing	  of	  the	  kind.	  Charges	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  –	  like	  charges	  of	  hypocrisy	  more	  generally	  –	  often	  disintegrate	  once	  we	  specify	  the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  relevant	  agent.	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  charges	  is	  that	  they	  may	  depend	  on	  taking	  those	  beliefs	  at	  a	  high	  (and	  obtuse)	  level	  of	  abstraction,	  when	  those	  who	  hold	  them	  do	  not	  take	  them	  in	  that	  way.	  	   Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  judge	  is	  charged	  with	  flip-­‐flopping	  if	  she	  favors	  invalidation	  of	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  but	  has	  no	  objection	  to	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation,	  or	  if	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  uphold	  gun	  control	  legislation	  but	  is	  unwilling	  to	  uphold	  restrictions	  on	  commercial	  advertising.	  At	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  abstraction	  (“does	  the	  judge	  believe	  in	  judicial	  activism?”),	  such	  a	  judge	  might	  be	  accused	  on	  flip-­‐flopping,	  but	  the	  charge	  might	  well	  be	  baseless	  in	  light	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  interpretation	  that	  the	  judge	  actually	  holds.	  A	  judge	  who	  believes	  that	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  requires	  racial	  neutrality,	  and	  no	  more,	  is	  hardly	  inconsistent	  if	  she	  votes	  to	  invalidate	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  but	  to	  allow	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation.	  A	  judge	  who	  votes	  to	  strike	  down	  an	  agency	  interpretation	  of	  law	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  violates	  the	  text	  of	  the	  underlying	  statute	  is	  not	  inconsistent	  if	  he	  later	  votes	  to	  uphold	  an	  agency	  interpretation	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  does	  not	  run	  afoul	  of	  any	  statutory	  text.	  We	  suspect	  that	  within	  the	  court	  system,	  accusations	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  are	  frequently	  and	  perhaps	  generally	  misplaced,	  because	  they	  fail	  to	  specify	  the	  theory	  under	  which	  the	  accused	  judges	  are	  operating.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  substantive	  due	  process	  and	  federalism,	  Chief	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  and	  Justice	  Kennedy	  can	  raise	  plausible	  defenses	  against	  the	  flip-­‐flop	  accusations,	  certainly	  if	  the	  decisions	  discussed	  above	  are	  treated	  in	  isolation.	  More	  broadly,	  and	  apart	  from	  theories	  of	  interpretation,	  there	  are	  two	  basic	  responses	  to	  a	  flip-­‐flop	  accusation	  that	  fall	  well	  within	  the	  conventions	  of	  legal	  reasoning.	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   Weighting.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  substantive	  due	  process,	  Justice	  Kennedy	  could	  argue	  that	  in	  both	  Casey	  and	  Lawrence,	  he	  took	  seriously	  the	  principle	  of	  stare	  decisis,	  but	  the	  principle	  had	  more	  weight	  in	  Casey	  than	  in	  Lawrence.	  In	  Casey	  after	  all,	  the	  precedent,	  Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  was	  almost	  20	  years	  old.	  Countless	  judicial	  opinions	  had	  relied	  on	  it,	  as	  had	  many	  state	  legislatures.	  Private	  actors	  had	  as	  well—by,	  for	  example,	  moving	  their	  households	  to	  conservative	  states	  or	  setting	  up	  abortion	  clinics	  in	  those	  states.	  Politicians	  had	  built	  their	  careers	  defending	  or	  criticizing	  Roe,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  had	  supplied	  a	  settled	  background	  for	  a	  longstanding	  public	  debate.101	  In	  Lawrence,	  the	  precedent	  (Bowers	  v.	  Hardwick102)	  was	  nearly	  as	  old,	  but	  states	  generally	  did	  not	  enforce	  their	  anti-­‐sodomy	  laws,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  anyone	  relied	  on	  the	  holding	  in	  Bowers.	  On	  this	  ground,	  Justice	  Kennedy	  was	  justified	  in	  giving	  relatively	  little	  weight	  to	  Bowers,	  while	  giving	  much	  weight	  to	  Roe.	  No	  one	  believes	  that	  stare	  decisis	  is	  absolute.	  Sometimes	  the	  arguments	  in	  its	  behalf	  are	  very	  strong,	  and	  sometimes	  they	  are	  weak.	  It	  is	  certainly	  arguable	  that	  the	  claims	  for	  stare	  decisis	  were	  stronger	  in	  Casey	  than	  in	  Lawrence.	  	  	   Similarly,	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  could	  argue	  that	  federalism	  concerns	  in	  Bush	  v.	  Gore	  were	  far	  less	  weighty	  than	  the	  federalism	  concerns	  in	  Gregory.	  On	  one	  view,	  Florida’s	  local	  law	  and	  its	  (arguably	  questionable)	  local	  judiciary	  made	  decisions	  that	  would	  have	  significant	  national	  import.	  In	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  it	  was	  contended	  that	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  called	  for	  a	  principle	  of	  equality	  in	  national	  elections	  that	  was	  not	  being	  respected	  by	  Florida	  officials.	  Retirement	  ages	  for	  state	  employees,	  by	  contrast,	  really	  are	  local	  in	  nature,	  and	  so	  federal	  legislation	  that	  attempts	  to	  control	  them	  runs	  afoul	  of	  weighty	  federalism	  concerns.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  ultimately	  convincing,	  it	  is	  certainly	  plausible	  to	  say	  that	  federalism	  concerns	  deserve	  different	  weights	  in	  different	  contexts	  –	  and	  hence	  that	  no	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  involved.	  	  	   Omitted	  institutional	  values.	  One	  institutional	  value	  must	  be	  weighed	  against	  others,	  and	  so	  even	  if	  the	  value	  about	  which	  a	  court	  allegedly	  flip-­‐flops	  is	  equally	  weighty	  in	  two	  cases,	  the	  outcomes	  would	  still	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  same.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  Justice	  Kennedy	  believed	  that	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  were	  a	  politically	  vulnerable	  group,	  one	  that	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  Carolene	  Products103	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  special	  level	  of	  judicial	  protection	  because	  its	  members	  could	  not	  defend	  themselves	  in	  the	  political	  arena.104	  This	  institutional	  factor	  could	  cut	  against	  stare	  decisis.	  	  	   As	  for	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  speculate	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  intervened	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  partisan	  Florida	  judges	  from	  throwing	  the	  election	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  point	  argues	  strongly	  in	  favor	  of	  respecting	  a	  contested	  precedent.	  102	  478	  U.S.	  186	  (1986).	  103	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Carolene	  Prods.	  Co.,	  304	  U.S.	  144,	  152	  n.4	  (1938).	  104	  See	  Bruce	  Ackerman,	  Beyond	  Carolene	  Products,	  98	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  713	  (1985).	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for	  Gore.105	  If	  that	  was	  a	  motivation	  for	  Chief	  Justice	  Rehnquist’s	  vote,	  he	  may	  well	  have	  believed	  that	  one	  institutional	  value—preserving	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  at	  the	  national	  level—superseded	  the	  values	  of	  federalism	  that	  controlled	  the	  outcome	  in	  cases	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  national	  presidential	  elections.	  	  	   The	  weighting	  and	  omitted-­‐values	  arguments	  are	  potentially	  available	  to	  the	  justices	  to	  avoid	  the	  flip-­‐flop	  charge,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  valid.	  Some	  people	  may	  agree	  that	  the	  weight	  that	  should	  be	  given	  to	  Roe	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  weight	  that	  should	  be	  given	  to	  Bowers;	  others	  may	  disagree.	  To	  resolve	  this	  disagreement,	  one	  must	  investigate	  further	  the	  underlying	  theory	  of	  precedent.	  A	  very	  simple	  theory—older	  precedents	  are	  given	  more	  weight—could	  genuinely	  constrain	  flip-­‐flopping.	  Others—for	  example,	  better-­‐reasoned	  precedents	  are	  given	  more	  weight—might	  themselves	  be	  too	  spongy	  to	  prevent	  flip-­‐flopping.	  Similarly,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  boundary	  on	  the	  type	  of	  institutional	  values	  that	  justices	  might	  invoke	  to	  rationalize	  their	  decisions.	  We	  might	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  accept	  weighting	  and	  omitted-­‐values	  arguments	  when	  justices	  candidly	  make	  those	  arguments,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  always	  do	  so—indeed,	  they	  did	  not	  Lawrence	  and	  Bush.	  	   D.	  Bayesian	  Updating	  	  	   Agents	  sometimes	  change	  their	  minds	  about	  institutional	  values.	  When	  they	  do	  so,	  their	  decisions	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  flip-­‐flop.	  But	  whatever	  one	  calls	  their	  decisions,	  the	  negative	  connotation	  of	  the	  word	  “flip-­‐flop”	  does	  not	  seem	  fair.	  The	  change	  in	  positions	  is	  not	  naïve;	  no	  merits	  bias	  and	  no	  motivated	  reasoning	  need	  be	  involved.	  Nor	  is	  it	  tactical	  or	  opportunistic;	  the	  agent	  is	  being	  sincere.	  But	  the	  change	  in	  position	  is	  genuine,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  at	  time	  2	  the	  agent	  invokes	  a	  value	  that	  she	  repudiated	  at	  time	  1.	  There	  is	  no	  hypocrisy	  here,	  and	  no	  naïveté,	  and	  nothing	  tactical.	  The	  agent	  has	  changed	  her	  mind.	  	  	   Consider,	  for	  example,	  a	  hypothetical	  proponent	  of	  executive	  power	  who	  has	  consistently	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  broad	  executive	  authority	  in	  general,	  and	  such	  specific	  manifestations	  as	  signing	  statements,	  unilateral	  war-­‐making,	  the	  line-­‐item	  veto,	  and	  so	  on.	  Her	  beliefs	  are	  based	  on	  her	  study	  of	  history;	  perhaps	  she	  believes	  that	  time	  and	  again	  the	  executive	  saved	  the	  day,	  while	  feckless	  legislatures	  and	  courts	  tried	  to	  hold	  it	  back.	  One	  day,	  this	  proponent	  realizes	  that	  her	  institutional	  assumptions	  were	  wrong.	  The	  executive	  is	  actually	  more	  dangerous	  than	  the	  other	  institutions,	  and	  cannot	  be	  trusted.	  She	  now	  opposes	  signing	  statements,	  unilateral	  war-­‐making,	  and	  the	  line-­‐item	  veto.	  	  	   Or	  consider	  a	  person,	  living	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,	  who	  reveres	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  federal	  judicial	  system,	  seeing	  it	  as	  the	  great	  bulwark	  against	  political	  corruption	  or	  tyrannical	  majorities.	  But	  as	  the	  Court	  repeatedly	  blocks	  much-­‐needed	  social	  legislation,	  she	  begins	  to	  think	  that	  it	  is	  a	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reactionary	  institution	  that	  holds	  the	  nation	  back.	  By	  1937,	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  support	  FDR’s	  court-­‐packing	  plan,	  having	  repudiated	  institutional	  values	  that	  would	  have	  caused	  her	  ten	  years	  earlier	  to	  oppose	  it.	  She	  adopts	  an	  approach	  associated	  with	  James	  Bradley	  Thayer,	  arguing	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  strong	  presumption	  of	  constitutionality,	  which	  she	  once	  believed	  to	  be	  indefensible	  and	  absurd.106	  She	  thinks	  that	  her	  new	  view	  reflects	  hard-­‐won	  wisdom.	  	   We	  could	  imagine	  a	  similar	  reversal	  in	  more	  recent	  decades.	  Suppose	  that	  in	  the	  1960s,	  observers	  (and	  perhaps	  judges	  as	  well)	  supported	  an	  aggressive	  role	  for	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  seeing	  courts	  as	  indispensable	  safeguards	  for	  politically	  weak	  groups.107	  Perhaps	  the	  Warren	  Court	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  desirable	  model.	  Perhaps	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  appeared	  to	  be	  “the	  forum	  of	  principle”	  in	  American	  government.108	  But	  suppose	  that	  in	  the	  last	  decades,	  people	  who	  were	  once	  inclined	  to	  this	  view	  have	  become	  disaffected,	  not	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  Warren	  Court	  was	  wrong,	  but	  because	  of	  a	  belief	  that	  it	  represented	  an	  unusual	  and	  perhaps	  unique	  period	  in	  American	  history.	  Perhaps	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  Court	  cannot	  protect	  politically	  weak	  groups,	  because	  it	  is	  unwilling	  to	  do	  so.	  Perhaps	  such	  people	  now	  think	  that	  the	  Court	  cannot	  be	  the	  forum	  of	  principle,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  good	  at	  moral	  theorizing.	  Good	  Bayesians	  could	  reject	  their	  previous	  position	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  justices	  are	  likely	  to	  use	  judicial	  power	  in	  ways	  that	  they	  would	  reject	  –	  and	  that	  a	  restrained	  judicial	  position	  is	  therefore	  better.	  Perhaps	  they	  end	  up	  embrace	  some	  version	  of	  Thayerism.109	  	  Alternatively,	  we	  could	  imagine	  people	  –	  once	  frustrated	  and	  even	  appalled	  by	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Warren	  Court,	  and	  insistent	  on	  a	  restrained	  judicial	  role	  –	  changing	  their	  view	  in	  light	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  originalist	  judging	  or	  firm	  judicial	  protection	  of	  liberty	  as	  they	  understand	  it.	  Those	  who	  reject	  progressive	  constitutional	  law,	  of	  the	  sort	  exercised	  by	  the	  Warren	  Court,	  might	  flip	  from	  an	  embrace	  of	  Thayerian	  to	  strong	  support	  for	  judicial	  restraint	  on	  the	  power	  of	  Congress	  under	  the	  Commerce	  Clause	  or	  on	  what	  might	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  takings	  of	  private	  property.	  Of	  course	  such	  people	  could	  not	  fairly	  be	  accused	  of	  an	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop	  if	  they	  held	  the	  same	  view	  all	  along.	  	  But	  if	  they	  shift	  from	  Thayerism	  to	  some	  other	  approach,	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  an	  institutional	  flip-­‐flop	  –	  not	  for	  tactical	  reasons,	  but	  because	  they	  have	  learned	  over	  time.	  In	  fact	  we	  can	  easily	  imagine	  numerous	  shifts,	  at	  least	  over	  a	  sufficient	  period	  of	  time.	  People	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  substantive	  views	  who	  favor	  an	  institutional	  position	  at	  Time	  1	  might	  flip	  at	  Time	  2,	  and	  flip	  back	  at	  Time	  3,	  only	  to	  flip	  again	  at	  Time	  4,	  all	  because	  of	  what	  they	  learn	  at	  relevant	  periods.	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   It	  is	  possible	  to	  accuse	  people	  who	  engage	  in	  such	  shifts	  of	  massive	  flip-­‐flopping	  across	  numerous	  policy	  areas.	  But	  in	  the	  cases	  we	  have	  described,	  the	  agent	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  term	  is	  not	  appropriate	  because	  of	  its	  negative	  connotations.	  She	  has	  legitimately	  changed	  her	  mind.	  Open-­‐mindedness	  is	  a	  virtue,	  and	  it	  is	  both	  important	  and	  honorable	  to	  learn	  over	  time.	  Still,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  type	  of	  global	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  always	  or	  necessarily	  less	  troublesome	  than	  the	  policy-­‐specific	  flip-­‐flop.	  We	  might	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  trust	  someone	  who	  could	  be	  so	  wrong	  (by	  her	  own	  lights)	  for	  so	  long.	  	  	   In	  any	  event,	  we	  call	  this	  type	  of	  flip-­‐flop	  “Bayesian	  updating”	  in	  order	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  people	  will	  rationally	  update	  their	  beliefs	  about	  institutional	  values	  as	  they	  obtain	  more	  information	  about	  how	  institutions	  work	  and	  of	  what	  they	  achieve.	  As	  they	  do	  so,	  they	  may	  change	  their	  beliefs	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  specific	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  specific	  institutional	  values.	  A	  person	  might	  think	  that	  signing	  statements	  are	  good	  until	  she	  loses	  trust	  in	  the	  executive	  as	  an	  institution,	  and	  then	  rationally	  believe	  that	  signing	  statements	  are	  bad.	  A	  person	  might	  think	  that	  an	  aggressive	  judicial	  role	  is	  good	  until	  she	  loses	  trust	  in	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	  judges,	  and	  then	  rationally	  believe	  that	  an	  aggressive	  judicial	  role	  is	  bad.	  Recall	  that	  institutional	  positions	  require	  some	  kind	  of	  substantive	  justification,	  at	  least	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  and	  reduced	  levels	  of	  trust	  certainly	  bear	  on	  substantive	  justifications.	  	  	   In	  some	  contexts,	  of	  course,	  serious	  questions	  might	  be	  raised	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Bayesian	  learning.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  right	  theory	  of	  constitutional	  interpretation	  is	  originalist,	  and	  suppose	  that	  that	  theory	  leads	  to	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  conclusions	  about	  certain	  issues	  involving	  executive	  power,	  voting	  rights,	  and	  the	  Commerce	  Clause.	  If	  so,	  any	  flip-­‐flopping,	  from	  one	  era	  to	  another,	  would	  be	  illegitimate;	  the	  agent’s	  role	  is	  to	  follow	  the	  original	  understanding.	  If	  the	  agent	  has	  learned	  something	  about	  the	  capacities	  and	  propensities	  of	  judges,	  she	  ought	  not	  to	  flip.	  She	  ought	  to	  continue	  to	  follow	  the	  original	  understanding.	  The	  general	  point	  is	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  institutional	  matters,	  Bayesian	  learning	  would	  be	  legitimate	  
only	  if	  what	  people	  are	  learning	  is	  legitimately	  relevant	  to	  their	  decisions.	  	  	   In	  the	  context	  of	  executive-­‐legislative	  relations,	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  questions	  do	  not	  involve	  constitutional	  law;	  they	  involve	  issues	  of	  policy.	  And	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  that	  judgments	  about	  constitutional	  law,	  or	  even	  interpretation	  as	  such,	  depend,	  in	  the	  end,	  on	  assessments	  of	  consequences,	  so	  that	  understandings	  about	  institutional	  performance,	  and	  the	  capacities	  of	  judges	  and	  legislatures,	  really	  should	  inform	  one’s	  choice	  of	  interpretative	  theory.110	  If	  so,	  institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  may	  in	  fact	  reflect	  a	  form	  of	  permissible	  updating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  new	  information.	  For	  those	  who	  believe	  (as	  we	  do)	  that	  an	  approach	  to	  interpretation	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  blind	  to	  consequences,	  it	  is	  not	  objectionable	  for	  someone	  to	  shift	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Thayerism	  when	  new	  information	  supports	  Thayerism,	  or	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  Thayerism	  for	  the	  same	  reason.	  Tactical	  flip-­‐flopping	  would	  not	  be	  admirable	  within	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the	  judiciary	  (putting	  to	  one	  side	  the	  practical	  issues	  faced	  by	  multimember	  courts),	  but	  nothing	  is	  wrong	  with	  learning	  from	  experience.	  	  Judges	  have	  on	  occasion	  changed	  their	  views	  about	  legal	  doctrine	  as	  a	  result	  of	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  learning.111	  For	  example,	  Justice	  Blackmun	  reversed	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  death	  penalty	  after	  voting	  to	  uphold	  it	  for	  many	  years.	  In	  an	  earlier	  decision,	  he	  had	  said	  that	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  death	  penalty	  was	  for	  legislatures	  to	  determine,	  while	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  courts	  to	  ensure	  that	  racism	  and	  other	  invidious	  factors	  did	  not	  influence	  capital	  punishment	  decisions.112	  Many	  years	  later,	  he	  argued	  that	  experience	  had	  taught	  that	  legislatures	  could	  not	  create	  rules	  that	  ensured	  that	  the	  death	  penalty	  could	  be	  administered	  fairly,	  and	  thus	  it	  was	  unconstitutional.113	  It	  was	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  intervening	  years	  that	  caused	  him	  to	  change	  his	  mind—and	  he	  appeared	  to	  change	  his	  mind	  about	  institutional	  values	  or	  capacities	  (the	  capacity	  of	  legislatures	  to	  ensure	  that	  capital	  punishment	  is	  administered	  fairly)	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  policy	  itself.	  	  	   Some	  people,	  particularly	  intellectuals,	  seem	  to	  undergo	  conversion	  experiences.	  They	  resist	  the	  accumulating	  evidence	  until	  it	  becomes	  irresistible	  and	  then	  repudiate	  their	  old	  views	  in	  one	  great	  burst	  of	  anguish.114	  Government	  officials,	  politicians,	  and	  judges	  seem	  to	  change	  their	  views	  more	  gradually.115	  It	  is	  frequently	  noted	  that	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  “drift”	  over	  time,	  becoming	  more	  liberal	  or	  more	  conservative.116	  This	  may	  reflect	  Bayesian	  updating.	  A	  more	  concrete	  example	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  Republican	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  lost	  trust	  in	  the	  executive	  branch	  and	  began	  turning	  against	  the	  Bush	  administration	  in	  the	  war-­‐on-­‐terror	  cases	  after	  disclosures	  of	  executive-­‐branch	  ordered	  torture	  of	  suspected	  terrorists.117	  In	  that	  context,	  there	  is	  a	  plausible	  argument	  about	  judicial	  learning.	  	  
III.	  Beyond	  Flip-­‐Flops?	  A	  Way	  Forward	  	  	   Flip-­‐flopping	  is	  so	  common	  that	  it	  has	  generated	  its	  own	  meta-­‐discourse,	  in	  which	  journalists,	  politicians,	  academics,	  and	  judges	  not	  only	  disagree	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  See	  Justin	  Driver,	  Judicial	  Inconsistency	  as	  Virtue:	  The	  Case	  of	  Justice	  Stevens,	  99	  GEORGETOWN	  L.J.	  1263	  (2011)	  (collecting	  examples	  of	  justices	  who	  have	  changed	  their	  minds).	  112	  Furman	  v.	  Georgia,	  408	  U.S.	  238,	  409	  (1972)	  (Blackmun,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  113	  Callins	  v.	  Collins,	  510	  U.S.	  1141,	  1143	  (1994)	  (Blackmun,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  114	  See,	  e.g.,	  David	  Mamet,	  From	  Left	  to	  Right:	  On	  the	  Mid-­‐Life	  Political	  Conversions,	  INDEPENDENT,	  Mar.	  15,	  2008,	  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/from-­‐left-­‐to-­‐right-­‐on-­‐the-­‐midlife-­‐political-­‐conversions-­‐796267.html	  (discussing	  examples	  of	  midlife	  conversions).	  	  
115 There are also interesting questions about academic flip-flops, both in general (as, for example, when 
teachers of constitutional law change their minds on certain issues, perhaps for narrowly partisan reasons, 
perhaps as a result of learning), and in the context of public service (as, for example, when academics 
depart significantly from their previous views while serving in government, or shift, as academics, away 
from views that they held while working for government). We do not engage those complex issues here. 116	  See,	  e.g.,	  Lee	  Epstein,	  Andrew	  D.	  Martin,	  Kevin	  M.	  Quinn	  &	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal,	  Ideological	  Drift	  Among	  
Supreme	  Court	  Justices:	  Who,	  When,	  and	  How	  Important?,	  101	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  1483	  (2007);	  Driver,	  
supra	  note	  112,	  at	  1274-­‐77.	  117	  We	  have	  heard	  this	  claim	  in	  conversation	  but	  cannot	  locate	  a	  source.	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substance,	  but	  also	  accuse	  each	  other	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping.	  These	  responses	  generally	  amount	  to	  little	  more	  than	  “gotcha!”,	  with	  implicit	  accusations	  of	  hypocrisy	  and	  bad	  faith.	  As	  noted,	  many	  of	  these	  allegations	  are	  unjustified.	  We	  think	  that	  there	  are	  more	  productive	  ways	  to	  approach	  this	  debate,	  though	  they	  raise	  problems	  of	  their	  own.	  	   A.	  Identifying	  the	  Problem	  	  	   Flip-­‐flopping	  is	  not	  inevitable.	  Indeed,	  from	  one	  perspective,	  it	  is	  surprisingly	  rare.	  Imagine	  that	  President	  Bush	  had	  announced	  in	  2008	  that	  because	  of	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  existed	  that	  (1)	  allowed	  him	  to	  stay	  in	  office	  beyond	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term;	  or	  (2)	  entitled	  him	  to	  stand	  for	  election	  to	  a	  third	  term;	  or	  (3)	  allowed	  him	  to	  jail	  political	  opponents	  who	  undermined	  the	  war	  effort	  by	  criticizing	  his	  policies.	  We	  are	  confident	  that	  if	  President	  Bush	  had	  made	  any	  of	  these	  claims,	  Republicans	  as	  well	  as	  Democrats	  would	  have	  opposed	  him,	  just	  as	  Democrats	  (and	  Republicans)	  would	  object	  if	  the	  president	  who	  made	  such	  claims	  were	  a	  Democrat.	  In	  this	  context,	  we	  think	  it	  plain	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  not	  flip-­‐flop—that	  they	  would	  oppose	  such	  actions	  regardless	  whether	  they	  were	  taken	  by	  a	  co-­‐partisan	  or	  a	  member	  of	  the	  opposite	  party.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  clear	  constitutional	  norms,	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  flip-­‐flopping.	  	  	   Flip-­‐flopping	  also	  is	  surprisingly	  rare	  for	  a	  range	  of	  longstanding	  norms	  that	  lack	  a	  constitutional	  foundation.	  It	  is	  an	  established	  practice	  for	  the	  majority	  party	  in	  the	  House	  or	  Senate	  to	  permit	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  party	  to	  sit	  on	  committees	  and	  question	  witnesses.	  We	  think,	  again,	  that	  if	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  majority	  party	  proposed	  depriving	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  party	  of	  their	  traditional	  seats,	  that	  leader	  would	  be	  opposed	  by	  co-­‐partisans	  as	  well	  as	  by	  members	  of	  the	  opposite	  party.	  Here	  again	  there	  is	  no	  flipping	  or	  flopping.	  	  	   A	  key	  precondition	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  thus	  seems	  to	  be	  ambiguity	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  constitutional	  or	  institutional	  norm	  exists.	  Consider	  whether	  a	  norm	  exists	  that	  permits	  filibusters	  of	  presidential	  nominees	  to	  executive	  branch	  offices.	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  that	  the	  norm	  exists—or	  that	  it	  does	  not	  exist.	  Disagreement	  prevails.	  In	  this	  setting,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  politicians	  flip-­‐flop.	  The	  problems	  with	  a	  norm	  permitting	  filibusters	  may	  be	  obvious	  when	  one’s	  party	  holds	  the	  presidency,	  and	  much	  less	  so	  when	  the	  other	  party	  holds	  the	  presidency.	  Since	  disagreement	  exists	  as	  to	  the	  existence	  and	  value	  of	  the	  norm,	  people	  may	  genuinely	  come	  to	  see	  costs	  or	  benefits	  that	  they	  previously	  overlooked	  when	  a	  different	  party	  held	  control	  of	  a	  relevant	  institution..	  	  	   We	  explore	  below	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  problem	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  results	  from	  a	  failure	  of	  enforcement	  (the	  topic	  of	  Section	  D,	  below).	  What	  we	  are	  emphasizing	  here	  is	  that	  at	  least	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  a	  product	  of	  ambiguity,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  ambiguity	  is	  a	  necessary	  whether	  or	  not	  sufficient	  condition.	  The	  ambiguity	  concerns	  the	  existence	  and	  contours	  of	  a	  purported	  norm,	  that	  is,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  norm	  has	  really	  been	  followed	  or	  not.	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For	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  filibustering;	  what	  is	  relatively	  new	  is	  the	  filibustering	  of	  	  executive	  branch	  nominees	  (or	  perhaps	  the	  filibustering	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  such	  nominees	  as	  opposed	  to	  isolated	  outliers).	  It	  may	  be	  unclear	  whether	  the	  norm	  that	  permitted	  filibustering	  of	  bills	  extended	  to	  executive	  branch	  nominees	  or	  not.	  Or,	  to	  consider	  another	  example,	  the	  principle	  of	  federalism	  dictates	  that	  state	  governments	  legislate	  with	  respect	  to	  local	  matters,	  but	  it	  is	  often	  ambiguous	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  local	  matter	  and	  what	  does	  not.	  	  	   In	  the	  face	  of	  such	  ambiguity,	  merits	  bias	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  influence.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  tactical	  changes	  of	  position	  to	  gain	  political	  advantage.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  face	  of	  ambiguity	  –	  rather	  than	  clearly	  established	  lines	  –	  that	  learning	  can	  produce	  shifts	  in	  institutional	  commitments.	  And	  yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  norms	  do	  come	  and	  go,118	  and	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  what	  once	  was	  clear	  can	  become	  ambiguous,	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  	   B.	  Optimal	  Institutional	  Design	  	  	   Flip-­‐flopping,	  then,	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  evaluating	  ambiguous	  rules	  of	  institutional	  design	  (including	  both	  constitutional	  and	  “sub-­‐constitutional”	  or	  institutional	  rules	  or	  norms)	  in	  the	  “midst”	  of	  normal	  politics.	  Parties	  recognize	  that	  some	  rules	  define	  the	  “game”	  of	  political	  conflict;	  those	  rules	  must	  be	  applied	  impartially	  to	  both	  parties.	  That	  is	  why	  everyone	  agree	  that	  the	  22nd	  amendment	  applies	  to	  Republican	  and	  Democratic	  presidents	  alike.	  But,	  as	  noted,	  many	  rules	  are	  ambiguous	  (including	  filibustering	  rules);	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  everyone	  would	  recognize	  the	  value	  of	  new	  rules.	  Indeed,	  new	  rules	  are	  being	  proposed	  all	  the	  time.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  rules	  that	  now	  govern	  campaign	  contributions	  (at	  least	  the	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  ones),	  or	  that	  require	  the	  GAO	  to	  determine	  the	  budgetary	  impact	  of	  proposed	  laws.	  The	  idea	  behind	  these	  rules	  is	  that	  they	  improve	  politics,	  or	  benefit	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole,	  without	  giving	  an	  advantage	  to	  a	  specific	  party;	  thus,	  if	  the	  rules	  are	  implemented,	  they	  must	  be	  enforced	  impartially.	  	  	   In	  an	  ideal	  world,	  flip-­‐flopping	  would	  be	  avoided	  if	  politicians	  honestly	  evaluated	  these	  rules	  and	  with	  the	  requisite	  information	  and	  impartiality,	  supported	  those	  that	  improved	  the	  political	  system.	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  rules	  would	  then	  depend	  on	  some	  kind	  of	  social-­‐welfare	  analysis.	  For	  example,	  a	  typical	  argument	  for	  campaign	  finance	  reform	  is	  that	  existing	  rules	  allow	  the	  rich	  to	  bias	  political	  outcomes	  in	  their	  favor	  and	  away	  from	  the	  public	  interest.119	  If	  so,	  public-­‐spirited	  politicians	  should	  support	  reform.	  Or	  consider	  a	  narrower	  justification.	  Unlimited	  campaign	  finance	  harms	  both	  parties	  by	  locking	  them	  in	  an	  arms	  race	  where	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In general, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Revision of Norms, 100 Ethics 756 (1990). 119	  See,	  e.g.,	  Fred	  Wertheimer,	  Legalized	  Bribery,	  POLITICO,	  Jan.	  19,	  2014,	  http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/citizens-­‐united-­‐campaign-­‐finance-­‐legalized-­‐bribery-­‐102366.html.	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spend	  all	  their	  time	  raising	  money	  and	  no	  time	  governing.120	  It	  also	  harms	  donors	  because	  their	  increased	  donations	  are	  cancelled	  out	  by	  donations	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  Campaign	  finance	  reform	  that	  put	  limits	  on	  donations	  benefits	  both	  parties	  without	  harming	  anyone.	  	  	   In	  a	  more	  realistic	  world,	  agreement	  on	  rules	  that	  advance	  the	  public	  welfare	  may	  be	  stymied	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  First	  and	  most	  familiarly,	  politicians	  do	  not	  necessarily	  act	  in	  the	  public	  interest;	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  in	  their	  own	  electoral	  interest.	  In	  the	  standard	  formulation,	  members	  of	  Congress	  try	  to	  maximize	  the	  chances	  of	  reelection.121	  Thus,	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  agreement	  on	  rules	  that	  are	  mutually	  beneficial	  for	  those	  who	  agree	  to	  them	  than	  on	  rules	  that	  advance	  the	  public	  interest,	  though	  to	  be	  sure	  many	  rules	  may	  do	  both.	  Second,	  politicians	  often	  face	  a	  conflict	  between	  their	  short-­‐term	  electoral	  interest	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  interest	  of	  their	  parties.	  For	  example,	  politicians	  may	  worry	  that	  campaign	  finance	  reform	  may	  prevent	  them	  from	  winning	  the	  next	  election	  even	  if	  they	  agree	  that	  it	  would	  help	  their	  party,	  or	  even	  themselves,	  if	  they	  survive	  that	  election.	  Third,	  and	  our	  particular	  focus	  here,	  politician	  may	  have	  difficulty,	  both	  because	  of	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  role	  of	  merits	  bias,	  figuring	  out	  whether	  a	  purported	  rule	  that	  serves	  her	  interest	  when	  she	  is	  in	  power	  but	  harms	  her	  when	  she	  is	  out	  of	  power	  (or	  vice	  versa)	  is	  in	  aggregate	  beneficial	  or	  harmful	  for	  her	  political	  interests.	  It	  is	  this	  last	  factor	  that	  may	  cause	  flip-­‐flopping.	  	  	   Similar	  points	  can	  be	  made	  about	  judicial	  flip-­‐flops.	  Consider	  a	  judge	  who	  strongly	  opposes	  abortion	  but	  also	  takes	  his	  judicial	  role	  seriously	  and	  acknowledges	  that	  as	  the	  law	  now	  stands,	  abortion	  rights	  are	  protected	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.	  Nonetheless,	  faced	  with	  a	  novel	  controversy—consider,	  for	  example,	  recent	  laws	  that	  restrict	  abortions	  based	  on	  purported	  or	  real	  concerns	  about	  women’s	  health122—the	  judge	  may	  be	  tempted	  (perhaps	  unconsciously)	  to	  allow	  his	  beliefs	  about	  abortion	  to	  influence	  his	  decision.	  He	  thus	  may	  uphold	  the	  laws	  by	  citing	  principles	  of	  federalism	  even	  though	  in	  another	  context	  he	  strikes	  down	  a	  state	  law	  notwithstanding	  principles	  of	  federalism.	  The	  judge	  flip-­‐flops	  on	  federalism,	  driven	  by	  his	  substantive	  beliefs.	  	   C.	  The	  Veil	  of	  Ignorance	  	  	   1.	  In	  general.	  A	  (potential)	  solution	  to	  these	  problems	  is	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  The	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  was	  made	  famous	  by	  John	  Rawls,	  who	  used	  it	  to	  motivate	  his	  theory	  of	  justice.123	  Rawls’	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  like	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐nature	  constructs	  used	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  See,	  e.g.,	  Andy	  Kroll,	  Retiring	  Senator:	  Congress	  Doesn’t	  Work	  Because	  We	  Fundraise	  Way	  Too	  Much,	  MOTHER	  JONES,	  Jan.	  28,	  2013,	  http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/01/tom-­‐harkin-­‐retire-­‐senator-­‐fundraise-­‐money.	  
121 For the classic discussion, see DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 
2004). 122	  See	  Andrea	  D.	  Friedman,	  Bad	  Medicine:	  Abortion	  and	  the	  Battle	  Over	  Who	  Speaks	  for	  Women’s	  
Health,	  20	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  J.	  WOMEN	  &	  L.	  45	  (2013).	  123	  JOHN	  RAWLS,	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  JUSTICE	  (1971).	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by	  earlier	  political	  theorists,	  allowed	  us	  to	  imagine	  the	  ideal	  constitutional	  norms	  that	  people	  would	  choose	  under	  conditions	  of	  impartiality.	  Because	  people	  did	  not	  know	  their	  positions	  in	  life,	  they	  would	  choose	  norms	  that	  advanced	  the	  public	  good	  or	  met	  other	  criteria	  of	  justice	  rather	  than	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest.	  	  	   The	  type	  of	  veil	  we	  have	  in	  mind,	  however,	  is	  less	  ambitious	  but	  for	  our	  purposes	  more	  familiar	  and	  helpful.124	  A	  politician	  who	  considers	  the	  merits	  of	  a	  norm	  against	  filibustering,	  or	  campaign	  finance	  reform,	  or	  a	  similar	  constitutional	  or	  institutional	  reform,	  should	  ask	  herself	  whether	  she	  would	  support	  the	  norm	  if	  she	  did	  not	  know	  whether	  she	  was	  a	  Republican	  or	  Democrat.	  The	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  deprives	  her	  of	  knowledge	  of	  her	  party.	  Under	  the	  veil,	  the	  politician	  would	  support	  the	  norm	  or	  reform	  if	  and	  only	  if	  she	  believes	  that	  it	  would	  advance	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	   Similarly,	  the	  judge	  in	  our	  example	  above	  might	  ask	  himself	  what	  the	  principle	  of	  federalism	  implies	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  he	  does	  not	  know	  whether	  he	  supports	  or	  opposes	  abortion,	  or	  indeed	  any	  of	  his	  political	  positions.	  This	  type	  of	  thinking	  encourages	  the	  judge	  to	  think	  about	  the	  merits	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  federalism	  abstracted	  away	  from	  a	  specific	  outcomes.	  Indeed,	  this	  type	  of	  impartial	  thinking	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  expect	  judges	  to	  do.	  	  	   Both	  naïve	  and	  tactical	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  an	  agent	  does	  not	  apply	  the	  discipline	  of	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  to	  her	  positions.	  The	  problem	  with	  merely	  accusing	  the	  agent	  of	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  which	  position	  the	  agent	  should	  adopt;	  it	  is	  just	  an	  accusation	  of	  bad	  faith	  or	  naiveté.	  The	  goal	  should	  be	  not	  just	  to	  shame	  the	  agent,	  but	  to	  force	  her	  to	  announce	  a	  position	  on	  the	  norm	  based	  on	  an	  argument	  from	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  	   2.	  Puzzles.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  is	  both	  time-­‐honored	  and	  appealing,	  but	  in	  the	  context	  at	  hand,	  it	  raises	  a	  series	  of	  puzzles.	  The	  first	  is	  normative.	  To	  see	  the	  problem,	  consider	  a	  stylized	  example.	  Suppose	  that	  a	  nation	  has	  two	  parties.	  Party	  A	  is	  usually	  in	  the	  majority,	  and	  it	  will	  be	  in	  the	  majority	  for	  the	  relevant	  or	  foreseeable	  future	  (two	  years?	  four	  years?	  eight	  years?).	  Party	  B	  represents	  the	  minority.	  Party	  A	  is	  committed	  to	  a	  program	  that	  would	  reduce	  both	  welfare	  and	  liberty;	  Party	  B	  strenuously	  resists	  that	  program.	  Let	  us	  stipulate	  that	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  deprives	  both	  parties	  of	  knowledge	  about	  which	  party	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  power.	  If	  both	  were	  placed	  behind	  the	  veil,	  they	  might,	  on	  plausible	  assumptions,	  	  choose	  a	  resolution	  that	  gives	  the	  majority	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  power.	  If	  so,	  Party	  B	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  object	  that	  the	  veil	  leads	  to	  an	  unfortunate	  and	  possibly	  even	  catastrophic	  outcome,	  and	  that	  if	  it	  is	  entitled	  to	  consider	  both	  its	  enduring	  minority	  status	  and	  the	  welfare-­‐reducing,	  liberty-­‐impairing	  program	  of	  the	  majority,	  it	  would	  insist	  on	  its	  current	  prerogatives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  See	  Adrian	  Vermeule,	  Veil	  of	  Ignorance	  Rules	  in	  Constitutional	  Law,	  111	  YALE	  L.J.	  399,	  399,	  403–04	  (2001).	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On	  this	  view,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  is	  unhelpful,	  because	  it	  deprives	  people	  of	  essential	  information.	  It	  is	  only	  with	  knowledge	  of	  the	  circumstances	  (i.e.,	  not	  behind	  a	  veil)	  that	  one	  knows	  what	  the	  right	  course	  is.	  Or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  treats	  optimal	  constitutional	  design	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  ideal	  theory,	  where	  it	  might	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  nonideal	  theory.	  It	  might	  follow	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  is	  helpful	  only	  if	  we	  benefit	  from	  having	  a	  degree	  of	  (unrealistic?)	  agnosticism	  about	  the	  future	  electoral	  success	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  also	  about	  which	  party	  is	  correct	  on	  the	  merits.125	  Is	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  veil	  should	  deprive	  the	  parties	  of	  that	  knowledge?	  On	  imaginable	  assumptions,	  the	  veil	  could	  produce	  outcomes	  inferior	  to	  those	  that	  would	  emerge	  if	  both	  parties	  know	  what	  is	  in	  their	  self-­‐interest.	  	   The	  second	  problem	  is	  conceptual.	  Behind	  the	  veil,	  how	  can	  the	  parties	  resolve	  their	  differences?	  What	  are	  the	  particular	  goals	  that	  a	  successful	  resolution	  would	  promote?	  To	  narrow	  the	  inquiry,	  let	  us	  focus	  on	  a	  discrete	  question	  that	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  relatively	  easy:	  whether	  and	  when	  the	  Senate	  should	  be	  authorized	  to	  filibuster	  executive	  branch	  nominees.	  To	  answer	  that	  question,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  balance	  the	  interest	  in	  allowing	  the	  President	  to	  select	  his	  own	  team	  against	  the	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  against	  incompetent	  or	  extreme	  officials.	  While	  these	  are	  the	  primary	  considerations,	  the	  parties	  might	  have	  to	  consider	  other	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  value	  (or	  not)	  of	  allowing	  “holds”	  as	  a	  means	  of	  extracting	  executive	  branch	  concessions	  on	  other	  matters	  (“extraction	  authority”).	  To	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  full	  range	  of	  considerations,	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  consider,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  the	  following:	  	  
 whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  President	  to	  have	  his	  own	  nominees	  in	  place,	  or	  whether	  “acting”	  officials	  can	  essentially	  do	  the	  job;	  
 whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  one	  or	  another	  adjustment	  to	  the	  filibuster	  rules	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  President	  could	  have	  his	  own	  nominees	  in	  place,	  and	  to	  what	  extent;	  
 the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  without	  certain	  uses	  of	  the	  filibuster,	  incompetent	  or	  extreme	  nominees	  would	  be	  chosen	  or	  confirmed;	  
 the	  opportunity	  costs	  that	  come	  from	  time	  spent	  closely	  examining	  executive	  nominees;	  
 the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  allowing	  the	  Senate	  to	  have	  the	  extraction	  authority	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  power	  to	  hold	  nominees.	  	   In	  the	  abstract,	  it	  is	  not	  simple	  to	  provide	  a	  disciplined	  answer	  to	  these	  questions.	  On	  certain	  (plausible)	  assumptions,	  the	  Senate	  should	  essentially	  allow	  the	  President	  to	  pick	  his	  team,	  and	  no	  kind	  of	  minority	  veto	  is	  justified.	  Political	  safeguards	  constrain	  the	  President’s	  choices,	  and	  if	  a	  nominee	  is	  genuinely	  incompetent	  or	  extreme,	  the	  Senate	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  not	  confirm	  him.	  If	  so,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  retain	  the	  ability	  to	  filibuster.	  On	  other	  (plausible)	  assumptions,	  the	  filibuster	  is	  an	  important	  safeguard,	  and	  the	  nation	  benefits	  from	  it.	  If	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Id.	  at	  402.	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safeguards	  are	  otherwise	  imperfect,	  the	  filibuster	  is	  a	  check	  against	  bad	  choices.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  true	  that	  behind	  the	  veil,	  Senators	  could	  agree	  that,	  all	  things	  considered,	  the	  filibuster	  should	  be	  used	  exceedingly	  rarely	  in	  these	  cases.	  That	  judgment	  seems	  at	  least	  as	  reasonable	  as	  any	  other.	  But	  it	  would	  reflect	  something	  like	  an	  informed	  hunch	  about	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  	   The	  third	  problem	  involves	  motivation	  and	  feasibility.	  Why,	  exactly,	  would	  Senators	  want	  to	  adopt	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance?126	  And	  exactly	  when,	  with	  what	  kinds	  of	  discount	  rates	  for	  the	  future?	  In	  a	  specific	  year	  –	  say,	  this	  one	  –	  the	  veil	  might	  not	  seem	  appealing	  to	  legislators	  who	  are	  concerned	  above	  all	  with	  their	  own	  electoral	  prospects,	  or	  who	  are	  focused	  above	  all	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  consequences	  (avoiding	  disastrous	  consequences	  in	  the	  next	  two	  years).	  If	  so,	  perhaps	  Senators	  could	  agree	  that	  they	  will	  adopt	  a	  specific	  resolution	  of	  an	  institutional	  question,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  certain	  year	  –	  say,	  three	  years	  hence.	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  would	  abstract	  from	  current	  controversies,	  and	  no	  Senator	  could	  know	  whether	  he	  would	  be	  helped	  or	  hurt.	  A	  settlement	  by	  a	  future	  date	  would	  create	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  	  	   But	  Senators	  who	  are	  now	  in	  the	  majority	  might	  well	  be	  ambivalent	  about	  that	  approach.	  It	  would	  not	  do	  anything	  to	  resolve	  their	  current	  problem,	  and	  if	  they	  anticipate	  being	  in	  the	  minority	  in	  the	  future,	  it	  might	  be	  profoundly	  unappealing.	  And	  what	  incentive	  would	  the	  current	  minority	  have	  to	  resolve	  the	  disagreement	  at	  that	  time?	  If	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  believe	  that	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  in	  the	  minority,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  drawn	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  settlement.	  Perhaps	  they	  would	  like	  the	  idea	  if	  they	  anticipate	  being	  in	  the	  majority	  –	  but	  if	  so,	  the	  current	  majority	  may	  well	  anticipate	  being	  in	  the	  future	  minority,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  question	  of	  feasibility	  returns.	  	   In	  some	  respects,	  an	  immediate	  solution	  might	  seem	  more	  appealing.	  At	  least	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  majority,	  such	  a	  solution	  would	  eliminate	  the	  existing	  problem,	  and	  would	  be	  attractive	  for	  that	  reason.	  Of	  course	  the	  majority	  will	  be	  aware	  that	  any	  solution	  might	  end	  up	  harming	  it	  if	  it	  loses	  its	  majority	  status.	  But	  that	  very	  awareness	  creates	  a	  kind	  of	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  whose	  effectiveness	  and	  reality	  turn	  on	  how	  much	  the	  majority	  discounts	  the	  future.	  	  	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  parties	  will	  resolve	  a	  disagreement	  about	  a	  norm	  by	  engaging	  in	  a	  deal.	  Bipartisan	  deals	  of	  this	  kind	  (or	  deals	  between	  branches)	  are	  familiar	  from	  disputes	  about	  the	  budgetary	  process,	  the	  sharing	  of	  executive-­‐branch	  information	  with	  Congress,	  and	  even	  filibustering.127	  What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  See	  id.	  at	  428-­‐32	  (describing	  how	  veil	  rules	  in	  the	  Constitution	  control	  the	  legislature	  by	  reducing	  the	  institutional	  “energy”	  of	  the	  legislature,	  assuming	  that	  self-­‐interest	  is	  the	  “principal	  spur	  to	  action,”	  id.	  at	  429).	  127	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ashley	  Parker	  &	  Jonathan	  Weisman,	  Congressional	  Leaders	  Reach	  Deal	  on	  Spending,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Dec.	  9,	  2014,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/us/politics/congressional-­‐leaders-­‐reach-­‐deal-­‐on-­‐spending.html	  (describing	  the	  recent	  spending	  package	  to	  fund	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  fiscal	  year,	  which	  included	  “more	  leeway	  for	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	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deals	  and	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance?	  Deals	  take	  place	  when	  the	  two	  parties	  believe	  that	  resolution	  of	  the	  dispute	  about	  the	  norm	  serves	  both	  parties’	  interests	  (or	  the	  interests	  of	  party	  leaders	  or	  majorities	  in	  each	  party).	  Thus,	  the	  deals	  may	  not	  necessarily	  advance	  the	  public	  interest	  (though	  they	  may).	  A	  deal	  to	  limit	  campaign	  finance	  may,	  for	  example,	  benefit	  incumbent	  members	  of	  both	  parties	  while	  harming	  challengers	  of	  both	  parties.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  encourages	  agents	  to	  take	  a	  more	  public-­‐spirited	  approach.	  It	  might	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  device	  for	  helping	  agents	  to	  see	  the	  perspective	  of	  their	  opponents.	  	   3.	  A	  procedure.	  While	  we	  recognize	  these	  problems	  with	  the	  veil	  construct,	  it	  nonetheless	  seems	  to	  us	  a	  useful	  method	  for	  thinking	  about	  flip-­‐flops.	  To	  be	  more	  specific,	  we	  propose	  a	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  for	  identifying	  and	  evaluating	  flip-­‐flops.	  	   In	  step	  one,	  we	  decide	  whether	  a	  purported	  flip-­‐flop—an	  apparent	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  positions	  about	  institutional	  values	  taken	  by	  an	  agent—is	  a	  real	  one.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  inconsistency	  is	  only	  apparent,	  not	  real:	  the	  agent	  can	  identify	  some	  additional	  institutional	  value,	  fact,	  or	  factor	  that	  explains	  the	  apparent	  inconsistency.	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  genuine—it	  is	  naïve	  or	  tactical.	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  naïve	  or	  tactical	  flip-­‐flop—or	  multiple	  flip-­‐flops	  by	  numerous	  agents	  in	  some	  policy	  domain—is	  of	  importance	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  a	  constitutional	  or	  institutional	  norm	  is	  unsettled.	  	  	   In	  step	  two,	  we	  demand	  that	  agent	  provide	  a	  justification	  for	  her	  institutional	  position.	  Typically,	  the	  agent	  will	  provide	  the	  justification	  from	  behind	  the	  veil—that	  is,	  by	  appealing	  to	  public	  values	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  agent’s	  self-­‐interest.	  By	  applying	  the	  veil,	  we	  transform	  a	  debate	  mired	  in	  political	  advantage-­‐taking	  into	  a	  debate	  about	  constitutional	  and	  institutional	  values	  that	  transcend	  party	  affiliation.	  If	  a	  consensus	  emerges	  about	  the	  optimality	  of	  a	  rule,	  then	  this	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  that	  rule.	  	  	   We	  do	  not	  contend	  that	  this	  two-­‐step	  process	  will	  always	  work.	  For	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  sketched,	  merits	  bias	  and	  short-­‐term	  incentives	  might	  prevent	  members	  of	  Congress	  from	  taking	  the	  relevant	  questions	  seriously.	  For	  analogous	  reasons,	  judges	  themselves	  might	  encounter	  some	  difficulty	  in	  using	  the	  veil.	  	  But	  if	  unjustified	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  to	  be	  avoided,	  the	  process	  provides	  the	  best	  imaginable	  safeguard	  –	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  more	  formal	  enforcement	  mechanisms,	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  	   D.	  How	  Are	  Institutional	  Norms	  Enforced?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  services	  companies	  under	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Wall	  Street	  regulatory	  law,”	  which	  was	  sought	  by	  Republicans,	  while	  making	  some	  concessions	  to	  Democrats	  by	  not	  fighting,	  for	  example,	  rules	  on	  nutritional	  content	  of	  school	  lunches	  and	  the	  President’s	  new	  immigration	  policy);	  Helen	  Fessenden,	  
The	  Limits	  of	  Intelligence	  Reform,	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS,	  Nov.–Dec.	  2005,	  106	  (detailing	  the	  deal	  struck	  by	  Congress	  and	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  that	  resulted	  in	  intelligence	  reform	  legislation	  in	  2004).	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   Institutional	  flip-­‐flops	  occur	  when	  people	  invoke	  institutional	  values	  in	  order	  to	  support	  ideological	  or	  policy	  outcomes,	  changing	  their	  positions	  on	  institutions	  whenever	  doing	  so	  supports	  immediate	  goals.	  Such	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  troublesome	  because	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  institutional	  rules	  do	  not	  matter.	  But	  if	  they	  do	  not,	  the	  gains	  from	  optimal	  institutional	  design	  are	  lost,	  and,	  indeed,	  in	  the	  extreme	  one	  may	  wonder	  how	  political	  organization	  can	  be	  possible.	  Thus,	  we	  turn	  in	  this	  section	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  constrained	  (putting	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  to	  one	  side).	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  collect	  and	  summarize	  some	  earlier	  observations,	  and	  survey	  some	  alternative	  theories	  as	  well.	  	  	   Legal	  enforcement.	  We	  begin	  with,	  but	  will	  immediately	  dismiss,	  one	  possible	  theory,	  which	  is	  that	  courts	  and	  other	  legal	  institutions	  should	  constrain	  flip-­‐flopping.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  is	  question-­‐begging.	  In	  the	  domain	  that	  interests	  us	  the	  problem	  is	  precisely	  that	  people	  must	  cooperate	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  legal	  enforcement.	  If	  senators	  avoid	  flip-­‐flopping	  on	  the	  filibuster	  rules,	  it	  is	  not	  because	  the	  threat	  of	  judicial	  enforcement.	  Indeed,	  judicial	  enforcement	  is	  in	  effect	  endogenous	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  we	  study.	  When	  people	  object	  to	  court-­‐packing	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  control	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  but	  then	  turn	  around	  and	  engage	  in	  just	  this	  activity	  when	  in	  power,	  courts	  themselves	  cannot	  constrain	  them—the	  degree	  of	  independence	  of	  the	  courts	  will	  itself	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  flip-­‐flopping	  or	  absence	  of	  it.	  	  	   Reputation.	  A	  more	  fertile	  theory	  is	  that	  agents	  avoid	  flip-­‐flopping	  (or	  excessive	  flip-­‐flopping)	  because	  flip-­‐flopping	  may	  damage	  their	  reputations	  or	  credibility.	  The	  mechanism	  is	  easy	  to	  understand.	  If	  Senator	  X	  criticizes	  the	  filibuster	  when	  in	  the	  majority,	  and	  lauds	  it	  when	  in	  the	  minority,	  people	  may	  stop	  believing	  anything	  that	  Senator	  X	  says.	  And	  if	  people	  do	  not	  believe	  Senator	  X,	  then	  she	  will	  have	  trouble	  of	  persuading	  them	  to	  support	  her	  proposals	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  mechanism	  is	  powerful	  enough	  that	  when	  confronted	  with	  these	  contradictions,	  Senator	  X	  will	  always	  respond	  by	  trying	  to	  distinguish	  the	  two	  settings.	  The	  plausibility	  of	  the	  distinctions	  that	  she	  draws	  will	  help	  determine	  her	  credibility	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	   Repeated	  interaction.	  A	  related	  theory	  is	  that	  agents	  avoid	  excessive	  flip-­‐flopping	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  cooperative	  relationships	  with	  other	  agents.128	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  senators	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  in	  the	  majority	  or	  in	  the	  minority	  after	  the	  next	  election.	  All	  senators	  believe	  that	  they	  gain	  more	  through	  retention	  of	  the	  filibuster	  (protecting	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  minority)	  than	  they	  lose	  (allowing	  them	  to	  prevail	  more	  often	  when	  in	  the	  majority).	  The	  next	  majority	  may	  then	  retain	  the	  filibuster,	  expecting	  that	  if	  it	  does	  not,	  the	  other	  party	  will	  retaliate	  by	  refusing	  to	  recognize	  the	  filibuster	  when	  it	  reaches	  power.	  This	  theory	  will	  be	  even	  more	  powerful	  for	  institutions	  like	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  where	  a	  small	  number	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  an	  example	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  this	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  of	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  “When	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of	  people	  must	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  risk	  losing	  cooperative	  gains	  if	  they	  flip-­‐flop.	  	  	   The	  reputation	  and	  repeated-­‐interaction	  mechanisms	  are	  subject	  to	  well-­‐known	  limits.	  They	  tend	  to	  work	  best	  in	  small	  groups,	  and	  when	  people	  expect	  to	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  well	  into	  an	  indefinite	  future.	  As	  noted,	  smaller	  institutions	  (courts)	  may	  avoid	  flip-­‐flops	  more	  effectively	  than	  larger	  institutions	  (say,	  the	  House).	  	  	   Internalization.	  Agents	  may	  avoid	  flip-­‐flopping	  out	  of	  a	  simple	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  We	  admire	  people	  who	  abide	  by	  principle	  (“statesmen”)	  and	  disparage	  those	  who	  do	  not	  (“hacks”).	  It	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  if	  these	  public	  values	  were	  internalized	  by	  some	  or	  many	  people.	  Internalization	  may	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  small-­‐group	  limits	  of	  the	  reputation	  and	  repeated-­‐interaction	  mechanisms.	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  unprincipled	  people	  are	  drawn	  into	  the	  political	  arena	  (a	  selection	  effect)	  or	  that	  even	  principled	  people	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  resist	  immediate	  pressure	  and	  may	  rationalize	  their	  flip-­‐flops	  to	  themselves	  (cognitive	  dissonance	  reduction).	  	  	   Public	  opinion.	  Public	  opinion	  may	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  agents	  to	  flip-­‐flop.	  If	  the	  public	  cares	  about	  institutional	  rules,	  then	  it	  will	  disapprove	  of	  those	  who	  try	  to	  manipulate	  them.	  But	  does	  the	  public	  have	  institutional	  values?	  One	  study	  suggests	  that	  public	  approval	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  public	  approves	  of	  particular	  outcomes,	  not	  on	  the	  jurisprudential	  quality	  of	  the	  opinions.129	  This	  seems	  hardly	  surprising.	  Still,	  politicians	  try	  to	  avoid	  the	  “flip-­‐flopper”	  label,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  prospect	  of	  public	  disapproval	  plays	  at	  least	  some	  role	  in	  constraining	  flip-­‐flopping.	  	  	   Foreign	  involvement.	  Political	  agents	  may	  try	  to	  constrain	  flip-­‐flopping	  by	  seeking	  enforcement	  from	  foreign	  countries.	  A	  well-­‐known	  theory	  posits	  that	  when	  eastern	  European	  countries	  made	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  initial	  wave	  of	  liberal	  leaders	  worried	  that	  reactionary	  elements	  would	  initially	  agree	  to	  liberal	  constitutional	  reforms	  but	  then	  flip-­‐flop	  when	  those	  elements	  finally	  came	  to	  power.130	  To	  forestall	  such	  flip-­‐flopping,	  these	  countries	  entered	  human	  rights	  treaties,	  hoping	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  involvement	  would	  deter	  the	  reactionaries.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  use	  that	  some	  former	  British	  colonies	  make	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  to	  settle	  internal	  disputes.131	  	  	   Foreign	  involvement	  as	  an	  enforcement	  mechanism	  must	  itself	  be	  subject	  to	  limits,	  given	  that	  the	  foreign	  countries	  that	  are	  empowered	  to	  intervene	  may	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themselves	  refuse	  to	  obey	  the	  rules.	  For	  this	  reason,	  most	  countries	  are	  not	  enthusiastic	  about	  yielding	  sovereignty	  to	  foreign	  countries	  or	  international	  organizations.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	   It	  is	  tempting	  to	  dismiss	  politicians,	  judges,	  and	  commentators	  as	  hypocrites	  who	  constantly	  shift	  positions	  on	  institutional	  norms	  so	  as	  to	  advance	  their	  electoral,	  political,	  or	  ideological	  interests.	  The	  temptation	  should	  be	  resisted.	  In	  most	  cases,	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  about	  institutional	  rules,	  which	  anchor	  debate	  and	  allow	  government	  to	  function.	  But	  when	  the	  rules	  are	  ambiguous,	  flip-­‐flops	  do	  arise.	  Unfortunately,	  ambiguity	  and	  hence	  flip-­‐flopping	  are	  present	  in	  many	  important	  settings.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  real	  or	  apparent	  flip-­‐flopping	  can	  be	  found	  in	  recurring	  debates	  over	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  	   In	  our	  view,	  many	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  a	  product	  of	  motivated	  reasoning	  and	  in	  particular	  merits	  bias.	  Often	  the	  merits	  seem	  clear,	  and	  if	  so,	  one’s	  judgments	  about	  institutional	  issues	  may	  be	  decisively	  influenced	  by	  one’s	  judgments	  about	  the	  merits.	  We	  have	  identified	  highly	  suggestive	  evidence	  of	  merits	  bias;	  we	  suspect	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  accounts	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  flip-­‐flops.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  institutional	  arguments	  are	  often	  opportunistic	  and	  hence	  tactical.	  Because	  politicians	  are	  not	  usually	  punished	  for	  making	  purely	  tactical	  arguments,	  and	  because	  they	  have	  strong	  incentives	  either	  to	  oppose	  or	  support	  the	  incumbent	  president,	  a	  degree	  of	  institutional	  flip-­‐flopping	  is	  inevitable.	  Within	  courts,	  the	  constraints	  of	  multimember	  tribunals,	  and	  the	  occasional	  difficulty	  of	  achieving	  a	  five-­‐person	  consensus	  on	  a	  single	  opinion,	  also	  ensure	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  flip-­‐flopping.	  	  	   Some	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  flip-­‐flops	  are	  a	  product	  of	  learning.	  In	  principle,	  it	  is	  not	  simple	  to	  distinguish	  between	  motivated	  reasoning	  and	  Bayesian	  updating.	  When	  people	  change	  their	  evaluations	  of	  a	  powerful	  presidency	  or	  judiciary,	  the	  two	  may	  be	  simultaneously	  involved.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  question	  that	  when	  some	  people	  flip,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  a	  period	  of	  disappointment	  with	  a	  particular	  allocation	  of	  institutional	  authority.	  	  Sometimes,	  of	  course,	  the	  relevant	  learning	  is	  not	  pertinent	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand,	  and	  hence	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  flip-­‐flop.	  But	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  an	  assessment	  of	  consequences	  legitimately	  bears	  on	  judgments	  about	  the	  allocation	  of	  authority,	  flip-­‐flops	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  honorable.	  	  	   In	  theory,	  there	  is	  a	  right	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  institutional	  arrangements	  should	  be—whether,	  for	  example,	  it	  advances	  the	  public	  interest	  if	  the	  Senate	  can	  filibuster	  presidential	  nominees.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  the	  answer	  is	  often	  obscure,	  and	  agents	  are	  not	  always	  well-­‐motivated	  to	  implement	  that	  answer	  even	  if	  they	  can	  identify	  it.	  A	  fundamental	  problem	  arises	  because	  an	  agent’s	  short-­‐term	  substantive	  or	  electoral	  interests	  may	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  reform	  of	  suboptimal	  institutional	  arrangements.	  These	  problems	  give	  rise	  to	  both	  naïve	  and	  tactical	  flip-­‐flops.	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   The	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  offers	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  disciplining	  argument	  about	  flip-­‐flops.	  When	  agents	  cannot	  show	  that	  an	  apparent	  flip-­‐flop	  is	  only	  apparent,	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  charges	  that	  they	  are	  naïve	  or	  acting	  in	  bad-­‐faith.	  In	  some	  cases,	  these	  charges	  will	  carry	  some	  sting	  and	  help	  change	  behavior.	  More	  important,	  when	  flip-­‐flopping	  over	  a	  particular	  issue	  is	  pervasive,	  we	  have	  an	  important	  signal	  that	  a	  constitutional	  or	  institutional	  norm	  is	  unsettled.132	  	  	   In	  that	  case,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  provides	  a	  useful	  device	  for	  forging	  consensus	  on	  what	  norm	  should	  be	  recognized.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  veil,	  one	  can	  propose	  institutional	  norms	  that	  promote	  resolution	  of	  unproductive	  disagreements	  and	  that	  are	  also	  fair,	  because	  they	  give	  no	  advantage	  to	  those	  on	  different	  sides	  of	  a	  partisan	  or	  policy	  divide.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  	  long-­‐term	  (and	  common)	  interest	  in	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  government	  that	  provides	  benefits	  to	  all	  or	  most	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  outweigh	  the	  short-­‐term	  advantage	  of	  insisting	  on	  institutional	  norms	  that	  advance	  immediate	  political	  objectives.	  In	  light	  of	  short-­‐term	  incentives	  and	  merits	  bias	  itself,	  we	  have	  identified	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  achieving	  the	  necessary	  consensus,	  but	  history	  demonstrates	  that	  those	  obstacles	  can	  sometimes	  be	  overcome.	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